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Foreword: 
 
This Major Paper constitutes my final requirement to attain a master’s degree in Environmental 
Studies and is a reflection of my Plan of Study (“POS”). The POS outlines the content of my 
academic program and my specific requirements for completing the Masters in Environmental 
Studies program.  My POS consists of learning objectives corresponding to four components 
related to land use planning appeals. These four components are:  
 
1) Urban Planning 
2) Administrative Law 
3) Procedural Fairness/Justice 
4) Land Use Planning Appeal Processes and Outcomes 
 
As the final deliverable of my POS, this Major Paper ties all of these components together in an 
analysis of the procedural justice characteristics of Ontario’s current and former land use 
planning appeal boards.  
 
Throughout my POS and Major Paper analysis, the role of public participation in urban planning 
takes centre stage. Public participation is the foundation of urban planning acting as a collective 
endeavor. While not the only method to participate in the planning system, administrative land 
use planning appeal boards provide one participatory mechanism.  This paper discusses the 
impact of participation and procedural fairness on land use planning appeal outcomes, and the 
consequences for the planning system overall.  
 
What and who influences municipal decision makers is an overarching theme of the urban 
planning component of my POS. This theme carries through to my Major Paper, as the impact of 
giving municipal planning instruments and decision makers more power is analyzed. 
Specifically, the impact of increasing municipal powers in a planning context that incentivises 
development, allows the development industry to influence decision making, and permits 
inadequate public consultation.  
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Under the administrative law component of my POS the dual role of administrative tribunals is 
discussed. These roles are to ensure governments are being held accountable for their decisions 
while also balancing the competing values of independent decision-making and efficient and 
affordable legal proceedings.  The manifestation and impact of these competing roles is 
highlighted in my Major Paper through the analysis of stakeholder’s justification for supporting 
or opposing the recent amendments made to Ontario’s planning appeal regime.  
 
The procedural fairness component of my POS highlights the factors that have the largest impact 
on a participant’s subjective view of fairness in a decision making context. This Major Paper 
takes these factors and directly applies them to an analysis of the current and former land use 
planning appeal tribunals. The results that arose out of the analysis are a direct result of the 
factors that influence a participant’s subjective view of fairness.  
 
The land use planning appeal process and outcomes component of my POS focuses on the 
legislative rules and procedures of tribunals and their ability to influence the planning system 
overall. This focus of my POS is touched upon several times throughout the Major Paper and 
shapes the main conclusion of the paper. Tribunals can set rules and procedures regarding 
participation, how decisions are made, and who is responsible for making these decisions. 
However, this Major Paper highlights that without viewing these procedures in a larger context, 
positive consequences for public participation and community outcomes can be lost.    
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Abstract 
 
 
The Ontario Municipal Board (“OMB”) was recently abolished and replaced by the Local 
Planning Appeal Tribunal (“LPAT”) as a result of stakeholder dissatisfaction with the appeal 
process. This research paper analyses characteristics of both the current and former appeal 
tribunals and concludes that the OMB provided a more just process than the LPAT. Specifically, 
the OMB permitted a greater number of issues to be appealed on more expansive grounds, the 
submission of new information and cross-examination during the appeal process, all participants 
to make oral submissions, and had impartial tribunal members make a greater number of 
decisions. The analysis exposes some equity related issues with the OMB, such as the high costs 
to participate in an appeal. However, the LPAT does not adequately address these concerns. 
Further, the LPAT has created several new concerns of its own, including increasing the weight 
of municipal planning instruments and the power of municipal decision makers. This paper 
discusses how increased municipal powers can be an issue in a system that incentivises 
development, allows the development industry to influence decision makers, and permits 
inadequate public consultation. This paper suggests that in an attempt to balance the pro-growth 
influences in land use decisions, more equitable considerations should be required in the 
planning process. Four additional topics for further research are suggested to support equitable 
considerations in the planning process. These topics are: the reinstatement of a support centre, 
requiring increase public consultation in the planning process, ensuring there is a requirement 
and adequate time to consult if a municipality makes a second decision on the same planning 
issue, and having the tribunal give more weight to meaningful public consultation.   
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Introduction 
 
Land use planning decisions across Ontario are often emotional, value laden processes that can 
result in conflict as community members and stakeholders compete for what each considers to be 
the most appropriate version of their community. Whether it be regarding a planning policy 
amendment, a proposal for a new commercial development, or the minor extension of a building 
footprint, community stakeholders can be passionate about municipal planning outcomes.  Once 
a planning decision is made (or not made), the resolution of any conflict that remains between 
community stakeholders usually falls under the jurisdiction of Ontario’s provincial land use 
planning appeal tribunal, the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (“LPAT”). On April 2, 2018, Bill 
139: Building Better Communities and Conserving Watersheds Act, 2017 (“Bill 139”) replaced 
Ontario’s former land use planning appeal board, the Ontario Municipal Board (“OMB”) with 
the LPAT. This was a response to stakeholder dissatisfaction with, among other concerns, the 
opportunity to participate in and influence decisions, the weight being given to certain voices, 
and the costs associated with the appeal process.1  Improving the fairness of Ontario’s land use 
planning appeal system was both a justification and cited outcome of the appeal board 
amendments.2 However, as with any institutional change, the outcomes must be analyzed and 
measured to ensure policy objectives are met and no unintended consequences arise.  
 
This research paper analyses characteristics of both the OMB and the LPAT to determine, from 
the subjective procedural fairness perspective of tribunal users, which appeal venue provides, or 
provided a more procedurally fair appeal process. As a result of a comparative analysis of 
procedural fairness criteria between tribunals, this paper determines if and where the OMB failed 
at providing a fair environment, if the LPAT addresses these issues, if the LPAT creates any 
issues of its own, and the overall impacts of Ontario’s new appeal tribunal on the land use 
planning system.  The analysis concludes that while both tribunals provide a relatively equal and 
unbiased opportunity for all parties to an appeal, in comparison to one another the OMB appears 
to have provided a more robust coverage of procedural fairness characteristics. For example, the 
                                                             
1 Government of Ontario, Review of the Ontario Municipal Board Public Consultation, (Toronto: Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 
October 2016) at 14 [OMB Review]. 
2 Ibid at 3; Ministry of Municipal Affairs, News Release, “Ontario’s Proposed Changes to the Land Use Planning Appeal 
System” (16 May 2017) [MMA, “News Release”]. 
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OMB permitted a greater number of issues to be appealed on more expansive grounds, permitted 
the submission of new information and cross-examination during the appeal process, permitted 
all appeal participants to make oral submissions, and had impartial tribunal members making a 
greater number of decisions, as opposed to the LPAT. Similarly, when focusing on the impact of 
each tribunal to the fairness and equity of Ontario’s planning system overall, a picture of the 
LPAT as a flawed appeal mechanism emerges.   
 
A equitable analysis of the planning and appeal process in Ontario looks at benefits derived from 
the system that do not favour those who already have means, influence, or power.3 The LPAT 
fails to directly address equitable concerns raised as an issue at the OMB in relation to the costs 
of effectively participating in the appeal process, as the resources needed to file a successful 
appeal were merely shifted to earlier in the process, as opposed to reduced.4 Similarly, in a move 
that will likely reduce the opposition to certain planning applications, anyone wishing to make 
oral representations at an appeal hearing must now risk an adverse cost order being issued 
against them.5 Amendments to the appeal regime did establish the Local Planning Appeal 
Support Centre (“LPASC”); a mechanism designed to address these cost concerns through 
providing free assistance and representation to appeal participants with unequal resources 
through the planning and planning appeal process.6 In addition to the LPASC, LPAT procedures 
also create a potential new public input opportunity for members of the public to participate in 
planning decisions through remitting a matter back to municipal councils if a successful appeal is 
filed.7 Despite the potential for Ontario’s new appeal regime to address current inequities in the 
planning and planning appeal process, the lived reality of the Bill 139 amendments may likely 
have a different outcome. For example, many of the LPASC’s target communities are unaware of 
its existence and the support it offers.8 Furthermore, the Provincial government has announced 
                                                             
3 Susan Fainstein, The Just City (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010) at 36 [Fainstein, “Just City”]. 
4 Confidential Interview Number 2 – Private Legal Professional [Interview 2]; Confidential Interview Number 3 – Private Legal 
Professional [Interview 3]; Confidential Interview Number 4 – Private Legal Professional [Interview 4]; Richard Lindgren & 
Monica Poremba, “Provincial Policy, Local Decision-Making and the Public Interest: Reforming the Ontario Municipal Board”, 
Submissions of the Canadian Environmental Law Association to the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and the Ministry of the 
Attorney General Regarding the Review of the Ontario Municipal Board (Environmental Registry No. 012-7196), (Canadian 
Environmental Law Association, 16 December 2016) at 11 [CELA, “OMB Submission”]; “(Re)Making Urban Space: Planning 
and the Politics of Urban Development From the OMB to the Local Planning Appeals Tribunal”(Speaker Series Lecture 
delivered at the Faculty of Environmental Studies, 26 September 2018) [FES, “Urban Space”]. 
5 Confidential Interview Number 5 – Non-Profit Legal Professional [Interview 5]. 
6 Local Panning Appeal Support Centre Act, 2017, SO 2017, c 23 Schedule II, s 2-4 [LPASC Act]. 
7 Planning Act, RSO 1990, c P 13 ss 17(49.7), (34(26.1-7), 34(26.8). 
8 Interview 2, supra note 4; Interview 5, supra note 5.    
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its intention to abolish the LPASC as of June 30, 2019.9  This coupled with the increased 
importance of information presented early in the planning process may result in the LPASC 
being ineffective at serving those communities it seeks to assist.10  
 
A direct consequence of many of the procedural changes to Ontario’s land use planning appeal 
tribunal is that municipal decision makers have been given increased power and control over the 
planning process. As a result, municipal planning documents have an increased significance, 
fewer municipal decisions can be appealed, and municipal councils have two opportunities to 
make a valid decision. The City of Mississauga’s comprehensive planning documents input 
process11, along with other international examples12 illustrate how municipal public deliberations 
can assist in addressing the unequal power dynamics within communities that are often exhibited 
during the planning process. However, municipalities and other planning organizations have also 
demonstrated that the current legislated public input mechanisms can be used inadequately, 
failing to take into account a diverse collection of viewpoints,13 or further entrenching 
inequitable planning processes and outcomes within communities.  
 
Additionally, municipalities rely heavily on property taxes as a revenue source.14 As a result, 
there is an incentive to make planning decisions that increase property values, specifically within 
lower income or vulnerable communities.15 Furthermore, the development industry is a major 
campaign contributor in municipal elections across the province.16 These contributions have been 
demonstrated to influence how councillors are likely to vote on development issues.17  In a 
                                                             
9 Giacomo Panico, “Citizens’ groups decry closure of zoning appeal agency”, CBC News (March 6 2019) online: CBC News 
<www.cbcnews.ca>. 
10 Interview 5, supra note 5.    
11 See Letter from the Associate Director of the Centre for Land Scape Research (19 December 2016) Comment ID 207241 Re: 
Consultation on role of Ontario Municipal Board in Ontario’s land use planning system, EBR File 012-7196 on Ontario 
Environmental Registry. 
12 See John Forester, The Deliberative Practitioner: Encouraging Participatory Planning Processes (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1999); Leonie Sandercock, “When Strangers Become Neighbours: Managing Cities of Difference” (2000) Planning Theory and 
Practice 1:1 13 [Sandercock, “Strangers”]. 
13 Marcia Valiante, “In Search of the “Public Interest” in Ontario Planning Decisions” in Public Interest, Private Property: Law 
and Planning Policy in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016) 104 at 115 [Valiante,“Public Interest”]. 
14 Enid Slack, “Enough Talk: The Case for Permitting New Municipal Revenue Tools”, delivered at the OGRA/ROMA 
Combined Conference, 23 February 2105, [unpublished] [Munk, “Municipal Revenue”]   
15 Susan Fainstein & Norman Fainstein “Regime Strategies, communal resistance, and economic forces” in Restructuring the 
City: The Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment (White Plains: Longman, 1986) 245 at 251 [Fainstein, “Regime 
Strategies”]. 
16 See Robert MacDermid, Funding City Politics: Municipal campaign finance and property development in the Greater Toronto 
Area. (Toronto: Vote Toronto & CSJ Foundation for Research and Education, 20019) [MacDermid, “Funding City Politics”]. 
17 Ibid at 10. 
How Does the LPAT Match-up? A Comparative Analysis of Ontario’s Current and Former Land Use Planning Appeal Board 
 
 9 
  
system where public input is often inadequate, municipalities benefit from developing land, and 
the development industry can play a large role in municipal politics, the potential for pro-growth 
interests to outweigh community input is large. 
 
Consequently, increasing municipal decision making authority in the appeals process means that 
any municipal procedure or outcome that favour unequal power, wealth, influence, or equity 
during the municipal decision making process is now unable to be addressed at the appeal level.  
The changes made to the land use planning appeals regime appear to have created an 
environment in which inequities within the overall planning system can not only remain, but 
potentially flourish. 
 
In addition to the LPAT not addressing procedural fairness and equity concerns raised by the 
OMB, the new tribunal has also created several novel issues of its own. The required increase in 
mandatory alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) and mediation discussions in pre-hearing 
conferences may be undermined by the new timelines for submitting appeal records and holding 
case management conferences as expenses have already been incurred and positions have been 
established.18 Additionally, proponents now have the opportunity to submit documents hours 
before a deadline resulting in an inadequate time frame for municipal decision makers to perform 
a comprehensive review.19 Certain municipalities are also straining under the new workload 
associated with preparing every planning decision as if an appeal will take place.20  
 
While the provincial government has made a commitment to public participation being a 
“cornerstone” of the land use planning system,21 the Bill 139 appeal regime amendments cast 
doubt on this claim. When compared to the OMB, the LPAT provides a weakened process in 
terms of subjective procedural fairness and does not address equity considerations raised. The 
responsibility for appropriate implementation of the planning system has been largely left to 
municipalities.  However, this increase in municipal decision making authority and power 
                                                             
18 Confidential Interview Number 1 – Private Legal Professional [Interview 1].  
19 “(Re)Making Urban Space: Planning and the Politics of Urban Development From the OMB to the Local Planning Appeals 
Tribunal”(Speaker Series Lecture delivered at the Faculty of Environmental Studies, 26 September 2018).  
20 Ibid.  
21 OMB Review, supra note 1 at 8. 
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provides an opportunity for previous inequities within the planning system to remain and 
potentially intensify.  
 
This paper suggests that equitable considerations are required in the planning appeals system in 
order to produce a truly fair process. A recommendation of four topics for further research are 
suggested to be completed in order to meet this outcome without a need to completely overhaul 
Ontario’s appeal system. The recommended topics for further research are: 
 
1) the reestablishment of the LPASC with a mandate to ensure the cost barriers to appeal 
participation are addressed and to increase public participation during the early stages of the 
planning process through outreach, education, and partnerships;  
2) the implementation of  municipal policy or provincial legislation mandating a more 
extensive, inclusive, and deliberative public participation scheme;  
3) ensuring that when a successful appeal is sent back to a municipal council from the LPAT 
that there is an appropriate amount of time to ensure a meaningful and required public input 
process can take place; and  
4) requiring that the LPAT give a higher weighting to municipal decisions in an appeal hearing 
that demonstrate that an extensive and deliberative public consultation process informed the 
outcome.  
 
To arrive at these conclusions and recommended topics for future research this paper first briefly 
outlines the framework for Ontario’s land use planning system and certain influences and factors 
that cause the system to continually generate conflict. Next, the paper discusses the role of land 
use planning appeal boards in resolving planning conflicts as well as the results of past attempts 
to reform the OMB, cumulating in the establishment of the LPAT. The methodology of the 
research study is then outlined and the results of the OMB and LPAT comparative analysis are 
identified and analyzed in terms of; if and where the OMB failed at providing a fair environment, 
if the LPAT addresses these issues, and if the LPAT creates any issues of its own. The analysis 
then further addresses the impacts of Ontario’s new appeal tribunal on the land use planning 
system overall, with special attention given to equitable considerations. Finally, the paper 
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discusses the potential consequences of the research on Ontario’s planning system and 
recommends future research topics. 
 
Ontario’s Land Use Planning Framework 
 
Land development in Canada is a highly regulated endeavour which can involve multiple layers 
of government and private enterprises.  Under the Constitution Act, 1867, exclusive jurisdiction 
over municipal institutions22 and property and civil rights23 is granted to provincial legislatures. 
In an exercise of these powers, provincial governments across Canada have enacted legislation 
granting municipal corporations the authority to make decisions on local issues, including land 
use planning.   
 
 
Figure 1: Ontario’s Land Use Planning System Framework (Source: OMB Final Consultation 
Document)24 
 
While authority is given to local municipalities to make various decisions, control of the over-
arching process and outcomes remain a result of the provincial framework. For example, the 
Province of Ontario ensures its interests are accounted for in the planning process by requiring 
all municipal planning documents and decisions to be consistent with provincial policy and to 
conform to, or not conflict with provincial plans.25 The hierarchy of how municipal documents 
must conform to provincial documents is set out above in Figure 1. As the de facto decision 
                                                             
22 Constitution Act, 1867, s 92(8). 
23 Ibid at s 92 (13).  
24 OMB Review, supra note 1 at 8. 
25 Planning Act, supra note 7 s 3(5). 
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makers within their community, elected municipal councils are powerful bodies in respect to 
urban planning and land development. While Ontario’s planning framework, set out primarily in 
the Planning Act, ensures other stakeholders are given an opportunity to influence the decision 
making process, politicians still have primary decision making authority.   
 
There are two legislative participatory avenues within the planning process for individuals or 
organizations to express their opinion on development or policy. The first is a public meeting 
prior to a land use decision being made, followed by the ability to file an appeal to an 
administrative tribunal subsequent to a decision.26  Historically when conflict arose as a result of 
a planning decision (or in certain cases, the failure to make a decision within a certain time 
period) the resolution of the dispute was left to the OMB. However, as a result of Bill 139, this 
responsibility now lies with the LPAT, which has replaced the OMB.   
 
Prior to its abolishment, approximately 4% of development or land use applications in Ontario 
resulted in a hearing before the OMB.27 Such a minor proportion of land use appeals may lead 
observers to conclude that urban planning and development within the province is relatively 
uncontroversial and without considerable disagreement.  While many land use planning 
applications do proceed without opposition, the reality is that significant conflict does arise from 
land use decisions. In addition to the broad nature and context of provincial planning documents 
resulting in conflicts over policy interpretation, implementation, and the best use of particular 
parcels, conflict also arises due to the economic and political nature of municipal decision 
making.  
 
Planning as a Stage for Conflict 
 
The very nature of the system under which Ontario municipalities operate serves as a catalyst for 
conflict over land uses.  For example, the high reliance on property taxes to fund municipal 
services and infrastructure creates an inherent incentive for municipalities to continually seek to 
maximize land values. As lower-income neighbourhoods often necessitate higher service levels 
                                                             
26 Ibid ss 17(15(d), 17(24), 22(7), 34(11), 34(12).    
27 Jennifer Pagliaro, “Contested Development”, Toronto Star (February 17 2017) online: Toronto Star 
<http://projects.thestar.com>.  
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in comparison to other neighbourhoods while also contributing less to the local tax base, these 
areas are often targeted by municipalities as locations to increase revenue.28 Consequently, local 
authorities attempt to attract new investment and tax sources to existing lower-income areas 
while concurrently trying to limit the expansion of such areas.29  
 
The types of instruments used to implement such priorities include municipal planning 
documents such as Official Plans (“OP”) and Zoning Bylaws (“ZBL”), which set-out the 
framework for how a municipality should grow and develop. While all community members are 
granted the opportunity to contribute to these planning documents, the input methods are widely 
viewed as not doing enough to include a full array of viewpoints, specifically in regards to 
marginalized individuals within the community.30 Growth and investment is not only seen as 
beneficial due to the increased tax revenue, but also due to the dependency of most 
municipalities on private investment for the provision of employment.31  In addition to the 
municipal interest of increasing tax revenues and providing employment for residents, private 
investors can also benefit from purchasing land and applying to the respective municipality for 
an amendment to its OP or ZBL in an attempt to increase land value.  
  
As John Logan and Harvey Molotch have observed, in the current globalized and largely 
capitalistic society where jurisdictions compete over investment, a key role of local government 
is to increase growth.32 This goal can be, and often is supported through influence by large 
capital forces within a city, such as the development industry, institutions, and local 
organizations, all of which benefit from population and economic growth within a 
municipality.33 For example, when a new convention centre district was proposed for San 
Francisco, two local newspapers were credited with influencing public opinion in favour of the 
development.34 In the 2018 Ontario provincial election, newspaper influence was also on display 
with direct endorsements by both the Toronto Star and Toronto Sun for the New Democratic 
                                                             
28 Fainstein, “Regime Strategies”, supra note 15 at 251. 
29 Ibid.  
30 Valiante,“Public Interest”, supra note 13. 
31 Fainstein, “Regime Strategies”, supra note 15 at 251. 
32 John Logan & Harvey Molotch “A Social Typology of Entrepreneurs: The City as a Growth Machine” in Urban Fortunes: The 
Political Economy of Place (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987; 2007) 50 at 63.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Susan Fainstein, Norman Fainstein, Jefferson Armistead “San Francisco: Urban Transformation and the Local State” in 
Restructuring the City: The Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment (White Plains: Longman, 1986) 202 at 223. 
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Party and the Conservative Party, respectively.35 Additionally, the Toronto Sun internally 
outlined a direct editorial stance in which it would implement to support the Conservative 
Party.36  
 
Other examples of support and influence over growth include institutional coalitions advocating 
for and funding urban renewal in low-income neighbourhoods, and developer contributions to 
municipal campaigns.  State sponsored urban renewal in New Haven advocated by a coalition of 
members tied to commissions and advisory bodies of Yale University displaced many low-
income and minority communities.37 A similar collation in Denver paid for a private institute to 
prepare recommendations to guide downtown development through stricter zoning regulations, 
streetscape changes, and buying large portions of centrally located land.38 The public authority 
leading the Denver development was criticized for funding office towers and high-end residential 
units at the expense of low income residents.39 As a result of the new development occurring, 
39% of households in one community were displaced by increased costs.40 Similar effects of 
rising property values have been seen in Toronto as between 2005 and 2013 a significant 
reduction of low and medium income residents was recorded in several “gentrifying” 
neighbourhoods.41  Influence over growth has also been observed through developer 
contributions to municipal campaigns in Ontario, as campaign contributions have been shown to 
influence how certain councillors may vote on development applications.42  
 
While not facing the same direct incentives as municipalities, Provincial governments understand 
and benefit from increased growth and investment and thus enable such municipal decisions 
through broad statements in provincial policy. The below statement comes directly from 
Ontario’s Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horse Shoe.   
                                                             
35 Maclean’s, “2018 Ontario election newspaper endorsements: Doug Ford or Andrea Horwath?”, Maclean’s (June 6 2018) 
online: Maclean’s <www.macleans.ca> .  
36 Jonathan Goldsbie, “These Appear To Be The Toronto Sun’s Provincial Election Plans”, Canadaland (April 18 2018) online: 
<www.canadalandshow.com> . 
37 Norman Fainstein & Susan Fainstein, “New Haven: the Limits of State Control” in Restructuring the City: The Political 
Economy of Urban Redevelopment (White Plains: Longman, 1986) 27 at 73 [Fainstein, “New Haven”].  
38 Dennis Judd, “From Cowtown to Sunbelt City: Boosterism and Economic Growth in Denver” in Restructuring the City: The 
Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment (White Plains: Longman, 1986) 167 at 178,180 [Judd, “Boosterism”]. 
39 Ibid at 182. 
40 Ibid  at 198. 
41 Patrick Cain & Jamie Sturgeon, “Low and middle-income families vanish as urban neghbourhoods gentrify”, Global News 
(March 18 2016) online: Global News <www.globalnews.ca>.  
42 MacDermid, “Funding City Politics”, supra note 16.  
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“ Better use of land and infrastructure can be made by directing growth to 
settlement areas and prioritizing intensification, with a focus on strategic 
growth areas, including urban growth centres and major transit station 
areas, as well as brownfield sites and greyfields. Concentrating new 
development in these areas provides a focus for investments in transit as 
well as other types of infrastructure and public service facilities to support 
forecasted growth, while also supporting a more diverse range and mix of 
housing options”.43 
 
Any OP adopted by an Ontario municipality must conform to the Growth Plan, which due to 
expansive statements, can be accomplished through a number of methods. Additionally, for all 
jurisdictional matters not delegated to local authorities, the provincial government is still 
responsible for making decisions.  
 
The coalitions or regimes that influence land development decisions have been given several 
descriptions and roles by various academics. For example, Clarence Stone characterizes an urban 
regime as “an informal yet stable group with access to institutional resources that enable it to 
have a sustained role in decision making”.44  Susan and Norman Fainstein describe the role of 
urban regimes as to “negotiate between the demands of electoral politics and capital forces.”45 
Despite the numerous descriptions of urban regimes, one common element agreed upon is that 
members of the public or community groups can persuasively partake in the decision making 
process if enough influence is garnered.46 This influence requires resources or numbers that low-
income communities often do not have access to. Examples of influential local movements in 
municipal land use decisions have been seen in Toronto47 and Denver.48 While the OMB did not 
prevent influences from affecting municipal decision making, it did ensure that decisions were 
based on defensible land use planning grounds.49 
 
                                                             
43 Government of Ontario, Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe, (Toronto: Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 2017) at 11. 
44 Karen Mossberger, “Urban Regime Analysis” in Jonathan Davies & David Imbroscio, eds, Theories of Urban Politics Second 
Edition (Oxford, 2009) 40 at 42-43. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid at 5.  
47 Ben Spurr, “Council freezes Walmart development”, Now Toronto (July 19 2013) online: Now Toronto 
<www.nowtoronto.com>.  
48 Judd, “Boosterism”, supra note 38.  
49 Interview 1, supra note 18.  
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As a result of the conflict created during the land-use planning process, specifically at the 
municipal level, specialized land use appeal tribunals have been established across many 
jurisdictions in order to provide stakeholders with a mechanism to review planning decisions in 
an independent and public manner.50 
 
Land Use Planning Appeal Tribunals: The OMB 
 
The role of a land use planning appeal tribunal, such as the former OMB or the LPAT is to 
provide a forum in which the development policies and decisions of a government can be 
challenged.51 Due to the conflicts over broad policy interpretation and implementation, the 
influence of politics, and the socioeconomic effects for community members, land use planning 
appeal tribunals have increasingly become a pivotal public input mechanism into a provincially 
led land use planning system.  
 
Originally named the Ontario Railway and Municipal Board, the OMB was established in 1906 
with a mandate to oversee rail transportation between and within municipalities.52 Over several 
decades, the OMB acquired jurisdiction over municipal decision making.53 As a result, more 
recently the majority of appeals that came before the OMB were in regards to land and 
development issues under the Planning Act.54 An average of 1,830 annual Planning Act appeals 
were filled with the OMB between 2003 and 2014.55 It is widely claimed that the OMB held a 
wider scope of power over resolving planning matters than other jurisdictions56 based on its 
ability to hear a broad range of matters and directly modify planning instruments.57  
 
  As a result of the wider scope of power, the OMB became the source of much scrutiny and 
discontent among stakeholders of land use development decisions. The most current attempt to 
                                                             
50 OMB Review, supra note 1 at 3. 
51 Nir Mualam, “Appeal Tribunals in Land Use Planning: Look-Alikes or Different Species - a Comparative Analysis or Oregon, 
England and Israel” (2014) 46 UrbLaw 33 at 35 [Mualam, “Appeal Tribunals”]. 
52 Aaron Moore, Planning Politics in Toronto: the Ontario Municipal Board and Urban Development (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2013) at 5 [Moore,”Politics in Toronto”]; OMB Review, supra note 1 at 11. 
53 Ibid; “About LPAT”, online: Environment and Land Tribunals Ontario <http://elto.gov.on.ca>. 
54 OMB Review, supra note 1 at 9. 
55 Regional Planning Commissioners of Ontario, Reforming the Ontario Municipal Board: Five Actions for Change, (31 August, 
2016) at 9 [RPCO, “Reforming the OMB”].  
56 Moore, “Politics in Toronto”, supra note 52 at 5; OMB Review, supra note 1 at 13; Ibid at 6.  
57 RPCO, “Reforming the OMB”, supra note 55 at 8.  
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reform the OMB was the result of stakeholder concerns regarding fairness issues such as a 
dissatisfaction with the ability of citizens to influence OMB proceedings, unpredictable decision 
making, and the cost, length, and amount of hearings.58  
 
The 2016 review resulted in the OMB’s replacement with the LPAT. However, this was not the 
first time changes to the tribunal had been considered or implemented by the provincial 
government due to stakeholder discontent. For example, previous changes to the land use appeal 
system included limiting appeals to provincial plans and policy statements, and limiting the role 
of the Statutory Powers and Procedures Act for land use planning appeals.59  Stanley Makuch 
described these changes as replacing “rule of law” values with more “administrative” values.60 
As a result of attempting to create efficiencies, these amendments resulted in a loss of 
accountability and a more arbitrary decision making system.61 Makuck describes the more 
preferable rule of law values as “predictability, certainty, and equality before the law between 
individuals in similar situations”.62 These values are important due to the underlying concepts of 
“rationality, fairness, and justice needing to be seen to be done”.63 
 
In 2004 a review of the provincial planning system was conducted, including a review of the 
OMB.64 During its 2004 consultation, issues such as the OMB’s ability to substitute its own 
decisions for municipal decisions, conducting de novo hearing on “planning merits”, and training 
issues for OMB members were raised.65 Resulting from this consultation, Bill 26: The Strong 
Communities Act, 2004 and was passed, implementing changes such as a requirement for the 
OMB to “have regard” for municipal decisions, restrictions of certain evidence before the OMB, 
and limiting the right of a person to appeal a planning decision to individuals or public bodies 
that made submissions respecting an application during the initial decision making period.66 
However, as Steven O’Melia, then of Miller Thomson LLP pointed out, these changes “may be 
                                                             
58 OMB Review, supra note 1 at 14. 
59 Stanley Makuch, “The Disappearance of Planning Law in Ontario” in Public Interest, Private Property: Law and Planning 
Policy in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016) 87 at 96 [Makuch, “Planning Law”].  
60 Ibid at 87.  
61 Ibid at 97-98.  
62 Ibid at 89. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Government of Ontario, Planning Reform, Ontario Municipal Board Reform: Planning Reform Initiatives (Toronto: Ministry 
of Municipal Affairs, June 2004). 
65 Ibid at 10-11, 14. 
66 Steven J. O’Melia, Changes Planned for the Ontario Municipal Board (Toronto: Miller Thompson LLP, December 2005).  
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unsettling to those accustomed to the [then] current process, but likely do not go far enough for 
those who are opposed to it”.67 
 
Steven O’Melia appears to have been correct in his assessment, as dissatisfaction with the OMB 
continued subsequent to the 2004 amendments.  A December 2013 submission to the Province of 
Ontario regarding the review of the land use planning and appeal system by the Regional 
Planning Commissioners of Ontario (“RPCO”) stated that the OMB system did not work in the 
best interest of “any party, be it municipality, developer, or private citizen” and that OMB 
Reform was the “largest planning-centred opportunity before the province”.68 An assessment of 
the 2016 Review of the OMB Public Consultation Document indicates similar issues with the 
tribunal to those that arose in 2004. For example, the jurisdiction and power of the OMB, 
conducting de novo hearings, citizen participation, and predictable decision-making, were all 
found to be important factors in in the dissatisfaction of the OMB by stakeholders.69 Both 
stakeholder input and independent analysis indicate that the OMB was criticized on many of the 
criteria influencing participants’ perception of fairness, including cost, opportunities to 
participate and the weight being given to certain voices.70  
 
As a result of Bill 139 the LPAT was established and several changes were made to the appeals 
process aimed at improving fairness and efficiency. While elements of procedural fairness are 
used throughout the land use planning system, land use planning appeal tribunals are the forum 
in which the procedural fairness elements of administrative law attempt to ensure a just outcome 
to planning decisions. Elements of a fair process, such as the ability to take part in a hearing or 
the proper use of information are a significant factor in creating a forum in which outside 
influences do not play a role in decision making. However, as argued by Susan Fainstien, a focus 
on procedural elements alone can and often does overlook the inequalities of wealth and power 
present within the planning system.71 As a result, this research paper will use an equitable lens to 
conduct a comparative procedural analysis of both the OMB and LPAT in order to understand 
                                                             
67 Ibid. 
68 Submission from Regional Planning Commissioners of Ontario, “RPCO SUBMISSION ON PROVINCIAL REVIEW OF 
LAND USE PLANNING AND APPEAL SYSTEM” (December 2013) at 2. 
69 OMB Review, supra note 1 at 5, 15. 
70 Ibid at 14.  
71 Fainstein, “Just City”, supra note 3 at 30.  
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the impact of these changes to how participants view the fairness of the appeal process, as well 
as how appeal processes contribute to the planning system overall.    
 
Evaluating the differences between Ontario’s former and current land use planning appeal 
regime against procedural fairness characteristics provides a useful analysis into the likely 
consequences of the amendments made to Ontario’s land use planning appeal system. 
Additionally, while procedural justice elements provide a valuable framework for tribunals to 
arrive at a procedurally fair outcome for participants, the legislative rules and processes of 
tribunals also contribute to the ability of tribunals to influence the planning system overall. 
Analyzing the impact of changes to land use appeal tribunals is a useful aspect in determining 
what power imbalances or conflicts are present in a planning system despite the ability to appeal 
a decision to a procedurally fair administrative tribunal.   
 
Research has been previously conducted on the planning appeal regime in Ontario, even in 
regards to what potential amendments to the processes of the former OMB should include.72 
However, to the knowledge of this researcher, no study has analyzed the effects of the provisions 
of Bill 139 on the perceived fairness of the appeal process and what its impacts will be on the 
planning system overall. Furthermore, to the knowledge of this researcher, no comparative 
analysis has analyzed appeal tribunal procedures through both a procedural and equitable lens. In 
addition to understanding the impact of the Ontario appeal process to the planning system and 
providing an analysis of procedural fairness within the planning appeal regime, this research 
paper also contributes to a gap in previous research through looking at this planning issue with 
an equitable perspective.  
Methodology: 
 
To effectively evaluate the impact of the amendments to Ontario’s land use planning appeal 
regime, identical elements of both the OMB and LPAT will be analyzed against criteria to 
measure the consequences of any change. Although comparisons of land use appeal tribunals are 
not common in academic literature, several assessments have been conducted to further 
                                                             
72 See RPCO “Reforming the OMB”, supra note 55.  
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knowledge regarding the methods used by tribunals to fulfil their legislative mandates. For 
example, studies have compared land use planning appeal tribunals in the United States 
(Oregon), Israel, and England;73 across four American jurisdictions;74 and between the UK and 
Australia.75    
 
The above comparative studies provide a broad foundation and descriptive overview of the 
procedures and operations of many land use planning appeal tribunals across several 
jurisdictions. This study combines the factors from these three studies to establish the identical 
elements of the OMB and LPAT that will be analyzed against criteria.  The elements are:  
 
1. Structural context of the tribunal; 
2. Statutory powers, responsibilities, and the role of each tribunal; 
3. The nature, form, and substance of an appeal; 
4. Type/form of hearing and procedures conducted, including if new evidence is accepted; 
5. Discretion of tribunal to intervene in local decisions;  
6. Process requirements; and 
7. Who has standing to file an appeal 
 
 
The perceived fairness of a procedure has been demonstrated to impact satisfaction despite a 
potential adverse outcome.76 As elements of fairness within the land use planning appeal process 
were both raised by stakeholders as a concern prior to the Bill 139 amendments, and cited as an 
outcome of the amendment process,77 it is evident that the fairness of the appeal process was 
targeted by the recent amendments. As such, analyzing the above elements of both the OMB and 
LPAT against perceived fairness criteria should provide measurable differences between the two 
tribunals and allow for a further analysis of the fairness consequences of the Bill 139 
amendments.   
 
                                                             
73 Mualam, “Appeal Tribunals”, supra note 5.  
74 Arthur C. Nelson, “Comparative Judicial Land-Use Appeals Processes” (1995) 27 UrbLaw 251. 
75 Stephen Willey, “Planning appeal processes: reflections on a comparative study” (2007) 39 Environment and Planning A 1676. 
76 Barbara Illsley, “Fair Participation: A Canadian Perspective” (2003) 20 Land use Policy 265 at 266 [Illsley, “Fair 
Participation”]. 
77 Supra note 2.  
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Leventhal was the first academic to suggest that certain procedural elements may influence how 
users of a system, including public input mechanisms, assess the fairness of its dealings.78 Early 
studies that analyzed the factors identified by Leventhal demonstrated that these procedural 
characteristics are very similar and used across many different contexts.79 As a result, more 
recent studies of these perceived procedural justice factors have been conducted during 
interactions with authorities and the justice system,80  public input into a planning decision,81 and 
in the natural resource and renewable energy decision making contexts.82 This study will look at 
these subjective procedural fairness characteristics, as opposed to those specifically 
contemplated by Canadian courts and tribunals (although many of the characteristics are similar). 
 
Previous studies consistently suggest that the ability to participate and be heard, the use of 
information/rationality, and correctability are important factors in the subjective views of 
fairness of a decision making process. Based on the findings from previous research, this study 
will look at the descriptive elements of the LPAT and OMB in regards to the following 
subjective procedural fairness criteria in order to determine the impacts on fairness as a result of 
the amendments to Ontario’s land use planning appeal system:  
 
(1) Representation;  
(2) Use of Information; and 
(3) Correctability 
 
For the purpose of this research, representation in the appeals process is defined as one’s ability 
to have a voice or influence, or involvement in the decision-making process. In the context of 
this study, representation is further broken down into the factors of circumstances an appeal can 
be heard under, and who had the ability to participate in a tribunal hearing.  The use of 
information in the appeals process encompasses the ability of tribunal members to access and 
comprehend available and relevant information when making decisions. This includes factors 
                                                             
78 Lind, E.A., and Tyler, T.R., The social psychology of procedural justice. (New York: Plenum Press, 1988) at 131-132 [Lind & 
Tyler, “Procedural Justice”].  
79 Ibid at 136.  
80 Tom Tyler, What is procedural justice: Criteria used by citizens to assess the fairness of legal procedures (Chicago: American 
Bar Foundation 1988). 
81 Illsley, “Fair Participation”, supra note 76.  
82 Patrick Smith & Maureen McDonough, “Beyond Public Participation: Fairness in Natural Resource Decision Making” (2001) 
14 Society and Natural Resources 239; Catherine Gross, “Community Perspectives of Wind Energy in Australia: The Application 
of a Justice and Community Fairness Framework to Increase Social Acceptance” (2007) 35 Energy Policy 2727. 
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such as the ability to present evidence during a hearing, and ADR measures. Correctability is 
simply the ability to correct a decision once the tribunal has issued an outcome.  
 
This research will first identify and evaluate the above seven descriptive factors of the OMB 
against the three procedural justice criteria to determine the strengths and limitations of the 
OMB.  Second, the identical descriptive factors of the LPAT will be identified and evaluated 
against the perceived procedural fairness criteria to determine the strengths and limitations of the 
LPAT. Both the analysis of the OMB and the LPAT is informed through a literature and 
legislation review in addition to interviews conducted with experts who possess experience, or 
knowledge in the proceedings of both the OMB and LPAT.   
 
As a result of the comparative analysis of tribunals the procedural fairness criteria determined: 
 if and where the OMB failed at providing a fair process; 
 if the LPAT addresses the issues found in the assessment of the OMB; 
 if the LPAT has created any issues of its own; and  
 the overall impacts of the appeal tribunals on Ontario’s land use planning system.  
 
In addressing the consequences of the appeal system amendments to the planning system overall, 
this paper will look at the amendments’ ability to impact equity considerations in the planning 
process. These considerations likely influence the distributional justice of appeal outcomes.  For 
this analysis, equity is defined as: “a distribution of both material and nonmaterial benefits 
derived from public policy that does not favour those who are already better off at the beginning 
– it does not necessarily require that each person be treated the same, but that treatment be 
appropriate”.83 
 
 
 
                                                             
83 Fainstein, “Just City”, supra note 3.  
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Results & Discussion  
 
The amendments between the OMB and LPAT resulted in the most significant changes being 
made in regards to OP and ZBL appeals. As such, this research focuses specifically on the 
changes to the land use planning appeals process in Ontario as they relate to OP and ZBL 
appeals.  Appeals in relations to other planning or subdivision matters, such as minor variances 
or plans of subdivision are not analyzed in this research.  
 
Appendix Two provides a direct comparison of the above seven descriptive factors between the 
OMB and the LPAT. As for this section of the paper, the descriptive factors have been 
categorized into the three procedural fairness criteria shown to influence user’s perception of 
fairness. The rules and procedures of the OMB are then described and analyzed to determine its 
strengths and limitations.  Similarly, the LPAT is also described and evaluated against the 
procedural fairness criteria to determine its strengths and limitations. Through a comparative 
analysis between tribunals, it was found that the OMB failed to provide just procedural 
outcomes. This paper examines whether the LPAT addresses the issues found in the assessment 
of the OMB, whether the LPAT has created any issues of its own, and the overall impacts the 
appeal tribunals has on the land use planning system.  
 
Ontario Municipal Board 
 
Representation 
Standing 
The OMB essentially granted two avenues in which an individual or public body could 
participate in an appeal hearing; they could be a Party or a Participant.84 The significant 
differences between these two designations was that Parties fully participated in the appeal 
hearing though making submissions, presenting evidence, and questioning witnesses.85 
Furthermore, a Party could be held liable for the appeal costs of an opposing Party if the conduct 
                                                             
84 Environment and Land Tribunals Ontario, Your Guide to the Ontario Municipal Board, (Toronto: Ontario Municipal Board, 
2009) at 6 [ELTO, “Guide to OMB”]. 
85 Ibid.  
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of a Party was unreasonable or if the Party has acted in bad faith.86 A Participant was permitted 
to make a statement during a hearing and be questioned, but was not permitted to question 
witnesses.87 The individual or body that filed an appeal was an Appellant Party.  
 
The OMB granted a person or public body who made submissions prior to the original municipal 
decision standing to appeal the approval of all or part of an OP and the approval of a ZBL or 
ZBL amendment, in addition to certain other types of appeals.88  However, other appeal types did 
not limit standing to those members of the public that had made submissions prior to the original 
decision, including an appeal of a municipality failing to make a decision within a certain time 
period in regards to an OP. In such a situation, any person or public body with an interest in the 
matter was granted standing to appeal.89  If one of these classes of individuals did not file a ZBL 
or OP appeal, but an appeal was nevertheless filed by another Party, the OMB permitted anyone 
who had the ability to file an appeal to be added to the hearing as an additional Party to the 
appeal, in addition to any individual or public body the tribunal determined was reasonable.90  
There were generally no requirements to becoming a participant, other than being present at the 
first day of the hearing and stating one’s intention to be a participant.91  
 
Matter/Circumstance: 
 
The OMB provided a wide variety of circumstances under which an OP or ZBL appeal could be 
filed. Each of these appeal types could be further broken down into other categories. For 
example, an OP was permitted to be appealed on a number of grounds, including part of, or all of 
a decision made by an approval authority, if the approval authority failed to make a decision, and 
decisions on private OP amendment requests.92 However, the Planning Act did limit certain 
types of OP appeals. For example, with the exception of the Minister,93 no party was permitted to 
appeal policies regarding secondary suites or an entire new OP.94 Additionally, no appeal was 
                                                             
86Ontario Municipal Board, Ontario Municipal Board Rules of Practice and Procedure at 103; Interview 5, supra note 5. 
87 ELTO, “Guide to OMB, supra note 84 at 7. 
88 Planning Act, supra note 7 ss 17(24), 22(7), 34(19). 
89 Ibid s 34(11). 
90 Ibid  ss 22(11.0.1), 34(24.1). 
91 ELTO, “Guide to OMB, supra note 84 at 7. 
92 Planning Act, supra note 7 ss 17(24), 17(36), 17(40), 22(7).  
93 Ibid at ss 17(24.1.1.), 17(36.1.1). 
94 Ibid at ss 17(24.1), 17(36.1)  
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permitted in regards to certain identified areas listed in the Planning Act95, a refusal or failure to 
alter the boundary of a settlement area, or establish a new settlement area.96 
 
ZBL appeals were permitted when an application for amendment was refused, or a decision was 
not made within a certain time period.97  However, these types of appeals were also limited, and 
no appeal was permitted in respect to a ZBL amendment for the alteration of an area of 
settlement boundary, a new area of settlement, or removing areas from areas of employment (if 
OP has such a policy).98 Appeals were also permitted to a ZBL or ZBL amendment if it was 
passed by council.99 However, with the exception of the Minister,100 no appeal was permitted in 
regards to any part of a bylaw that gave effect to OP policies regarding secondary suites.101   
 
Under the OMB regime, both OP and ZBL appeals were permitted to be filed on the basis that 
the original decision was made without proper consideration given to land use planning grounds 
or was inconsistent with a provincial policy, conflicted with or did not conform with a provincial 
plan, or failed to conform to an upper tier official plan (if applicable).102 Such land use planning 
grounds that could have warranted an appeal included the impacts of development on the 
character of the neighbourhood, shadowing impacts, or environmental impacts.103   
 
According to the Environment and Land Tribunals of Ontario’s (“ELTO”) 2016-2017 Annual 
Report, ZBL and OP appeals accounted for 445 files before the OMB and 1335 appeals.104 This 
appears to indicate that several appeals were filed together. ELTO either does not track, or 
publically provide the basis upon which ZBL or OP decisions are appealed. As such, it is 
difficult to know just how many appeals were filled under each justification. While not-
comprehensive, a search of the top twenty OMB and LPAT Lexis Advance Quicklaw decisions 
that contain the phrase “Official Plan” between October 1, 2016 and October 10, 2018 provides a 
                                                             
95 Ibid ss 17(24.5), 17(24.4), 17(36.4).  
96 Ibid s 22(7.2).  
97 Ibid s 34(11). 
98 Ibid ss 34(11.0.4), 34(11.0.5) . 
99 Ibid s 34(19). 
100 Ibid s 34(19.2). 
101 Ibid s 34(19.1).  
102 Ibid ss 17(46), 34(25.1). 
103 Marie Corbett, “The Ontario Municipal Board: Planning and Zoning Cases” (1976) 14 Osgoode Hall LJ 93 at 103.  
104 Environment and Lands Tribunals Ontario, ELTO Annual Report 2016-17, (Toronto: Environment and Lands Tribunals 
Ontario, June 2017) at 42.  
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snapshot of what issues were being appealed during this timeframe. These Lexis Advance 
Quicklaw decisions are listed in Appendix Three of this research paper. Of the top twenty search 
results, seven either dealt with appeals outside the scope of this research, or were an Order from 
the Tribunal.105 Of the remaining thirteen decisions, a total of twenty-five issues were appealed 
(twenty-three under the Planning Act).106 Four decisions were in regards to both a decision on a 
privately requested amendment to an OP and ZBL amendment.107 Two other decisions also dealt 
with the failure to make a decision on a plan of subdivision, or another provision in an OP.108 
Three appeals dealt specifically with passing a ZBL,109 with an additional two regarding the 
passing of a bylaw plus the passing on an OP.110  The other appeals were ZBL related, plus an 
additional planning appeal.111  
 
While it can be difficult to determine with precision what justifications were used when a 
tribunal member formed a decision, of the thirteen decisions cited, eight specifically mentioned 
that land use planning considerations were taken into account during the decision making 
process.112  These references often came in the form of discussing whether the provisions were 
“appropriate”113  in addition to conforming to the provisions of the Planning Act, or represented 
“good planning” and were in the “public interest.”114 Specific decisions even reference how 
proposed amendments are beyond density maximums set in an OP, but should be applied given 
the attributes of the proposed development,115 or, that if there was no policy basis for approving 
an OP amendment justification could be found based on “past approvals or the existing built 
form and physical context in the vicinity of the subject property”.116  
 
 
                                                             
105 See Appendix Three: Decisions 4, 7, 8, 12, 14, 15, 20 
106 See Appendix Three: Decisions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11 13, 16, 17, 18, 19. 
107 See Appendix Three: Decisions 1, 2, 9, 19.  
108 See Appendix Three: Decisions 16, 18. 
109 See Appendix Three: Decisions 6, 10, 11. 
110 See Appendix Three: Decisions 13, 17. 
111 See Appendix Three: Decisions 3, 5.  
112 See Appendix Three: Decisions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 18. 
113 See Appendix Three: Decisions 1, 2, 5, 6.  
114 See Appendix Three: Decisions 2, 3, 10, 11, 18.  
115 See Appendix Three: Decision 11 para 43.  
116 See Appendix Three: Decision 2 para 42.  
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Use of Information  
 
Evidence 
 
Both OP and ZBL appeal hearings permitted the introduction of new evidence if the OMB 
determined the information may have materially affected the municipality’s original decision.117 
The procedure for introducing new evidence gave discretion to the OMB to notify, and give the 
appropriate municipal council the opportunity to reconsider its decision in light of new 
information. If the council reconsidered the decision and made a recommendation to the OMB 
within the required time limit, the OMB was required to have “regard for” the 
recommendation118. However, it has been conceded that the ability to send significant new 
material back to municipal councils was not widely used or considered during appeals.119 It was 
suggested that OMB members often permitted the introduction of new information during a 
hearing without referring the information back to council, as many motions to send the evidence 
back to council were refused, or caused significant delays.120  
 
Evidence was generally submitted though expert witnesses, although sworn affidavits were also 
used. Again, while not comprehensive, an analysis of the same twenty OMB and LPAT Lexis 
Advance Quicklaw case studies provides a snapshot of how prevalent the use of expert evidence 
is during a hearing. Of the thirteen decisions regarding either an OP or ZBL appeal, all thirteen 
decisions heard expert planning evidence from a witness.121  
 
Dispute Settlement 
 
ADR can be defined as any form of dispute resolution which does not involve the use of 
adjudication by a court or tribunal.122 In the context of Ontario’s land use planning appeals 
                                                             
117 Planning Act, supra note 7 ss 17(44.3)-(44.6), 34(24.3)-(24.6).  
118 Ibid.  
119 Letter from the Ontario Home Builders Association (December 19, 2016) Re: Ontario Municipal Board Review, EBR File 
012-7196 on Ontario Environmental Registry [OHBA, “Letter”].  
120 RPCO “Reforming the OMB”, supra note 55 at 14. 
121 See Appendix Three Decisions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19.  
122 Wayne Martin, “Alternative Dispute Resolution – A Misnomer?” (Paper) delivered at the Australian Disputes Centre 
Inaugural Annual Address, Perth, March 6 2018), [unpublished] at 4. 
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system, ADR usually means mediation. Mediation was an attempt to come to an agreement 
outside of the hearing setting, was agreed to, and involved only the parties to the appeal.123 A 
prehearing conference took place prior to a hearing and was used primarily to identify issues or 
participants, exchange documents, and determine the procedures for the hearing.124 Prehearing 
conferences were also be used to discuss opportunities for settlement or mediation.125 The option 
for a party (specifically a municipality) to use mediation or other forms of ADR were offered 
legislatively for OP and ZBL appeals.126 Prehearing conferences were at the discretion of the 
OMB, but could be requested by Parties.127  
 
Again, the ELTO either does not track or provide the public with statistics in regards to how 
many OMB cases used the ADR option or took part in a prehearing conference. However, out of 
the thirteen Lexis Advance Quicklaw cases studies analyzed, five were identified as having gone 
to a prehearing conference;128  six reached a settlement or partial settlement;129 and board-
assisted mediation was used during one appeal.130  At least one conference resulted in a number 
of participants being added to the appeal;131 at least one appeal was withdrawn subsequent to a 
prehearing conference being held, although it is unclear whether the pre-hearing conference 
influenced this result;132 and it appears as though three cases reached some sort of settlement 
after the prehearing conference took place.  
 
An analysis conducted by the RPCO between 2003 and 2014 concluded that an average 68% of 
scheduled hearings actually took place.133 While it is not clear is if settlements were reach in any 
of the remaining 32% of cases, it was likely the result for a number of them. Additionally, of the 
hearings that were held, an average of only sixty-eight (5%) of them involved mediation.134 In 
2015-2016, forty-nine OMB cases were successfully resolved as a result of mediation.135  
                                                             
123 ELTO, “Guide to OMB, supra note 84 at 9. 
124 Ibid. 
125 OMB, “Rules”, supra note 86 at 70. 
126 Planning Act, supra note 7 ss 17(26.1), 17(37.2), 22(8.1), 34(11.0.0.1), 34(20.1). 
127 OMB, “Rules”, supra note 86 at 70. 
128 See Appendix Three Decisions 3, 6, 16, 19. 
129 See Appendix Three Decisions 5, 6, 13, 16, 17, 19. 
130 See Appendix Three Decision 19.  
131 See Appendix Three Decision 18 para 5. 
132 See Appendix Three Decision 18 para 6.  
133 RPCO “Reforming the OMB”, supra note 55 at 10. 
134 Ibid. 
135 OMB Review, supra note 1 at 29.  
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Correctability 
 
The OMB had the jurisdiction and was permitted to dismiss an appeal, approve all or part of a 
bylaw or plan, make modifications to and then approve a bylaw or plan, or issue an order 
directing a municipality to take one of these actions.136  
 
Decisions of the OMB were final and binding, with the exception of any question of law, which 
was appealable to the Divisional Court.137 If the matter at issue was in respect to a question of 
fact the OMB also had the authority to review, rescind, or vary any decision it has made via an 
Internal Review.138  However, a request for a review of a decision was required to be submitted 
to the tribunal within thirty days of the decision139 and were rare.140  
 
OMB Analysis:  
 
This analysis of the OMB considers how stakeholders felt about the effectiveness of the former 
appeal tribunal in regards to its perceived strengths, and weaknesses. The consequences of many 
of the rules and procedures of the OMB touch upon several fairness issues and have been 
analyzed accordingly.  Furthermore, despite the perceived fairness of procedures influencing 
how participants view an appeal tribunal, a focus on procedure alone can overlook inequalities in 
power and wealth within the overall planning system.141  
 
As a result, this analysis also examines how the procedures of the OMB may have ignored 
equality and equity considerations in the planning appeal process and planning decision making.  
The analysis shows that with the small and limited exception of the requirement of the OMB to 
“have regard to” original municipal decisions, the other characteristics of the OMB appear to 
have been procedurally fair for appeal participants. However, when observing the effect of the 
                                                             
 
136 Planning Act, supra note 7 ss 17(50), 34(11.0.2), 34(26). 
137 Ontario Municipal Board Act, RSO 1990, c. O 28 at 96(1).  
138 Ibid  s 43.  
139 OMB, “Rules”, supra note 86 at 112 
140 Interview 4, supra note 4.  
141 Fainstein, “Just City”, supra note 3 at 30. 
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OMB’s procedures and rules, a different result becomes evident. The costs associated with filing 
and effectively participating in an appeal hearing created a barrier to representation for potential 
participants with limited resources.142 Similarly, while appeals were already limited to a number 
of matters under the OMB, there was a strong push from certain stakeholders to place a further 
limit on appeals,143 which would result in a more powerful municipal council and an increase in 
the significance of municipal planning documents.  A full summary of the characteristics 
considered and stakeholder feedback raised throughout the OMB analysis can be seen in Figure 
2.  
 
Ontario Municipal Board 
Characteristic of the OMB Concerns or Feedback 
Participation rights given via either Party or Participant status.  
 
 Certain participants were put at a distinct disadvantage as 
they were not able to afford legal counsel or expert planning 
evidence.144  
Appeals were permitted on part of, or all of a decision and if no 
decision was made within a certain time period. However 
certain appeal types were limited. 
 Types of appeals should be further limited as decisions 
should be made at the local level by elected 
representatives.145  
 No further limitations on what issues could be appealed, as 
that would require an assumption that certain government 
policies are sufficiently robust and protective.146  
Appeals were permitted to be on the grounds that the original 
decision did not give proper consideration to land use planning 
grounds; or was inconsistent with a provincial policy, conflicted 
with or did not conform with a provincial plan, or failed to 
conform to an upper tier official plan (if applicable). 
 The OMB should only review conformity issues with 
provincial policy and to allow elected municipal councils 
the deference to decide on planning matters.147  
De Novo appeal hearings permitted the introduction of new 
evidence if the OMB determined the information may have 
materially affected a municipality’s original decision  
 The costs associated with providing evidence at an OMB 
hearing created a barrier to participation in the appeal 
process.148 
 De novo hearings discounted the democratic process and 
tribunal decisions should be based on only the information 
reviewed by a municipality.149 
                                                             
142 CELA, “OMB Submission”, supra note 4 at 16; Illsley, “Fair Participation”, supra note 76 at 271; Moore, “Politics in 
Toronto”, supra note 52 at 53; Dan Scheid, Municipal and Developer Success Rates at the Ontario Municipal Board: A London 
Ontario Case Study (MPA Research Report, University of Western Ontario, 2016) [unpublished] [Scheid, “Success Rates”]; 
Letter from the Bayview Village Association, Re: Review of the Ontario Municipal Board at 1 [BVA, “Letter”].  
143 Letter from Grey County Council (22 November 2016) Comment ID 202957 Re: Consultation on role of Ontario Municipal 
Board in Ontario’s land use planning system, EBR File 012-7196 on Ontario Environmental Registry [Grey County, “Letter”]; 
Letter from the City of Kawartha Lakes (5 October 2016) Comment ID 207230 Re: Consultation on role of Ontario Municipal 
Board in Ontario’s land use planning system, EBR File 012-7196 on Ontario Environmental Registry [Kawartha Lakes, 
“Letter”]; RPCO “Reforming the OMB”, supra note 55 at 19, 31.  
144 See note 142.  
145 See note 143.  
146 CELA, “OMB Submission”, supra note 4 at 5, 7.  
147 Letter from the Federation of Citizens’ Associations of Ottawa (Dec 8, 2017) FCA Response to OMB Review at 8 [FCA, 
“Letter”]. 
148 Supra note 142.  
149 Letter from Unknown Participant (5 October 2016) Comment ID 196747 Re: Consultation on role of Ontario Municipal Board 
in Ontario’s land use planning system, EBR File 012-7196 on Ontario Environmental Registry; [Unknown Participant 1, 
“Submission”] Letter from Unknown Participant (5 October 2016) Comment ID 196682 Re: Consultation on role of Ontario 
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 De novo hearings were the best way to hear appeals as it 
provided a “safety net” to municipal decisions that were 
made with political justifications.150 
The option to use ADR was available. Pre-hearing conferences 
were at the discretion of the OMB, but could be requested by 
parties.   
 General satisfaction with successful mediation hearings 
created a desire to require mediation for all appeal 
hearings.151  
 Concerns as to how mediation can be used as a tool by 
certain parties to push up costs of opposing parties and force 
a settlement.152 
 A question of law was appealable to the Divisional Court and a 
question of fact could be internally reviewed by the OMB. 
 Appeal hearings should be recorded to avoid intimidation 
and threats from opposing counsel and to provide evidence 
in the case of a dispute to a claim in a written decision.153  
An OMB decision could approve all or part of a bylaw or plan, 
make modifications to and then approve a bylaw or plan, or 
issue an order directing a municipality to take one of these 
actions. 
 De novo hearings discount the democratic process and 
tribunal decisions should be based on either only the 
information reviewed by a municipality, or should only be 
able to overturn a municipal decision if the decision went 
against provincial planning policy.154  
Figure 2: OMB Analysis Summary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
Municipal Board in Ontario’s land use planning system, EBR File 012-7196 on Ontario Environmental Registry [Unknown 
Participant 2, “Submission”]; Letter from Unknown Participant (5 October 2016) Comment ID 207142 Re: Consultation on role 
of Ontario Municipal Board in Ontario’s land use planning system, EBR File 012-7196 on Ontario Environmental Registry 
[Unknown Participant 3, “Submission”]; BVA, “Letter”, supra note 142 at 1.  
150 Submission from the Federation of Rental-housing Providers of Ontario (December 19 2016) Response to the OMB 
Consultation ERB # 012 – 7196 at 10 [FRPO, “Submission”]; OHBA, “Letter”, supra note 119 at 7; Interview 1, supra note 18; 
Interview 2, supra note 4; Interview 4, supra note 4. 
151 Letter from Unknown Participant (5 October 2016) Comment ID 196727 Re: Consultation on role of Ontario Municipal Board 
in Ontario’s land use planning system, EBR File 012-7196 on Ontario Environmental Registry [Unknown Participant 4, 
“Submission”]; Letter from Bruce County (17 November 2016) Comment ID 205304 Re: Consultation on role of Ontario 
Municipal Board in Ontario’s land use planning system, EBR File 012-7196 on Ontario Environmental Registry [Bruce County, 
“Submission”]; OMB Review, supra note 1 at 28; Grey County, “Letter”, supra note 143; Kawartha Lakes, “Letter”, supra note 
143. 
152 Letter from the Ontario Greenbelt Alliance (19 December 2016) Comment ID 207163 Re: Consultation on role of Ontario 
Municipal Board in Ontario’s land use planning system, EBR File 012-7196 on Ontario Environmental Registry [OGA, “Letter”] 
Letter from Environmental Defence (31 May 2017) Comment ID Re: Consultation on role of Ontario Municipal Board in 
Ontario’s land use planning system, EBR File 012-7196 on Ontario Environmental Registry [ED, “Letter”]; FCA, “Letter”, supra 
note 147 at 7. 
153 Letter from Unknown Participant (5 October 2016) Comment ID 205704 Re: Consultation on role of Ontario Municipal Board 
in Ontario’s land use planning system, EBR File 012-7196 on Ontario Environmental Registry [Unknown Participant 5, 
“Letter”]; OHBA, “Letter”, supra note 119 at 6; Letter from the Ontario Green Party (5 October 2016) Comment ID 207236 Re: 
Consultation on role of Ontario Municipal Board in Ontario’s land use planning system, EBR File 012-7196 on Ontario 
Environmental Registry [Green Party, “Letter”]; Letter from the Toronto and Region Conservation Authority (19 December 
2016) Comment ID 207248 Re: Consultation on role of Ontario Municipal Board in Ontario’s land use planning system, EBR 
File 012-7196 on Ontario Environmental Registry [TRCA, “Letter”]; Letter from Gravel Watch Ontario (5 October 2016) 
Comment ID 207251 Re: Consultation on role of Ontario Municipal Board in Ontario’s land use planning system, EBR File 012-
7196 on Ontario Environmental Registry [Gravel Watch, “Letter”]; Letter from Unknown Participant (5 October 2016) Comment 
ID 205703 Re: Consultation on role of Ontario Municipal Board in Ontario’s land use planning system, EBR File 012-7196 on 
Ontario Environmental Registry [Unknown Participant 6, “Letter”].  
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Representation 
 
“In principle, any Ontarian interested in, or potentially affected by, land use 
planning decisions must have a meaningful opportunity to fully participate in the 
decision-making process, particularly where such decisions are appealed to the 
OMB since it effectively serves as the final arbitrator of planning disputes”155 
 
 The rules that governed the OMB restricted the types of decisions that could be appealed and 
limited those who were permitted to appeal a decision to either those who had made submissions 
during the application process, or to those the tribunal found to be reasonable.156 Despite these 
limitations, the procedures still provided the ability for equal representation for all who were able 
to participate in an appeal.  Notwithstanding the possibility of equal representation, several 
academic reports and case studies detailing specific OMB proceedings indicate that the costs 
associated with a hearing created a barrier to effective representation.157 Evidence of cost barriers 
to participating in the appeal process was also supported through submissions made to the 
provincial government during consultation on OMB reform and interviews with industry 
professionals.158  
 
Stakeholder submissions to the provincial government during the 2016 OMB review stated that 
“the single greatest barrier to meaningful participation in Planning Act appeals is the continued 
lack of funding tools to enable citizens and non-governmental organizations to retain legal, 
technical and planning assistance often required by parties in OMB proceedings”.159  A result of 
this barrier was, in part, that the OMB did not hear relevant perspectives on planning matters.160 
For example, in a disagreement over a proposed development in the Downsview area of Toronto, 
at least one community group, the Downsview Lands Community Voice Association did not 
participate in an OMB appeal due to the potential costs of the process.161 Likewise, during the 
appeal of a proposed development in the Yorkville area of Toronto, another community group 
was forced to remove itself from the appeal as it was no longer able to afford the appeals 
                                                             
155 CELA, “OMB Submission”, supra, note 4 at 2. 
156 Planning Act, supra note 7 ss 17(44.2), 22(11.0.1), 34(24.1).  
157 Illsley, “Fair Participation”, supra note 76 at 271; Moore, “Politics in Toronto”, supra note 52 at 53; Scheid, “Success Rates”, 
supra note 142.   
158 CELA, “OMB Submission”, supra note 4; BVA, “Letter”, supra note 142; Interview 4, supra note 4. 
159 CELA, “OMB Submission”, supra note 4.  
160 Ibid at 17.  
161 Illsley, “Fair Participation”, supra note 76 at 271.  
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process.162 The inability to afford legal counsel or to effectively take part in an appeal at all was 
a significant limitation to one’s ability to be represented through the tribunal process. 
Furthermore, proceeding with an appeal without legal counsel put parties at a distinct 
disadvantage, as studies indicate that represented tribunal parties are more likely to receive a 
favourable outcome in their proceeding as opposed to an unrepresented party.163 
 
The cost associated with participating in an appeal hearing not only influenced decisions to take 
part in a proceeding and acquire legal counsel, but also the ability to adequately obtain and 
portray relevant information.  While OMB procedures granted an equal opportunity for parties to 
acquire and submit evidence, in practice the costs appear to have been prohibitive for parties 
with fewer resources.  A 2013 study by Aaron Moore suggests that many community groups or 
individuals were not able to afford the costs associated with hiring expert witnesses to present 
critical information in determining the outcome of an appeal.164 Additionally, a further study 
concluded that expert planning evidence was the main deciding factor in the majority of 
appeals.165   Moore suggests the justification for why many OMB appeal outcomes appeared to 
favour developer or municipal positions was due to the fact that land developers and sizeable 
municipalities were able to afford the costs of both expert witnesses and legal counsel.166  
Similarly, residents groups also suggested that the OMB had principle regard for evidence 
submitted by expert witnesses, which many citizens or citizen groups found difficult to afford.167 
The Bayview Village Association (“BVA”) stated that a community must raise approximately 
$100,000 for counsel and witnesses to effectively defend a position.168  Additionally, the 
Federation of Citizens’ Associations of Ottawa (“FCA”) claimed that in addition to a lack of 
finances, a majority of counsel and experts are unwilling to support an appeal filled by a citizen 
or community group.169  A 2017 Toronto Star report came to the conclusion that OMB decisions 
                                                             
162 Moore, “Politics in Toronto”, supra note 52 at 53. 
163 Hazel Genn, “Tribunals and Informal Justice” (1993) 56 The Modern Law Review 393 at 398, 400. 
164 Moore, “Politics in Toronto”, supra note 52 at 53. 
165 Scheid, “Success Rates”, supra note 142.   
166 Moore, “Politics in Toronto”, supra note 52 at 53. 
167 BVA, “Letter”, supra note 142. 
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169 FCA, “Letter”, supra note 147 at 4, 6.  
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favoured developers, however, the costs associated with hiring planning and legal experts were 
not clearly considered in this Toronto Star report.170 
 
Despite the claim that many municipalities are able to “absorb” the costs associated with OMB 
hearings, it was indicated that OMB appeal cost concerns influenced how municipal decisions 
were being made.  For example, decisions were often made to avoid spending resources on the 
OMB process, questioning the integrity of the “quality of planning” that was been approved.171 
For larger municipalities in Ontario, annual costs associated with OMB hearings ranged from 
$0.5-$4 million, exclusive of internal staff time and resources, according to the RCPO.172  The 
City of Waterloo alone spent $1.7 million on an appeal of its Upper Tier OP.173 Notably, this was 
an issue for smaller municipalities with fewer, and more limited resources.174  
 
While the procedural elements of the OMB were fair in that they provided equal opportunity to 
become a party or participant to an appeal, the execution of procedures failed to take into 
account inequalities of wealth and power that were present in the planning decision making 
process.175  The unequal distribution of resources that often existed among parties to an appeal 
and the advantage these resources created at an OMB hearing were a barrier for effective 
participation in the planning appeals process and an equity based concern regarding the OMB.  
 
Appeal Categories:  
 
A point of conflict among stakeholders arose in regards to representation and the number of 
categories under which an appeal could be filed at the OMB. In terms of OP and ZBL appeals, 
the OMB already placed several limitations on what could be appealed. Despite a previous 
reduction on appeal categories being described by Stanley Makuch, as a “failure to have an open 
and accountable planning system in which members of the public and individual landowners 
have an opportunity to publically challenge the direction of public policy and planning for the 
                                                             
170 Jennifer Pagliaro, “Planning Power and Politics”, Toronto Star (February 17 2017) online: Toronto Star 
<http://projects.thestar.com>.  
171 RPCO “Reforming the OMB”, supra note 55 at 13. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid.  
174 FES, “Urban Space”, supra note 4; Interview 4, supra note 4.  
175 Fainstein, “Just City”, supra note 3 at 30. 
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province”,176 there was minimal desire by stakeholders to increase the matters upon which an 
appeal could be filed with the tribunal. In fact, there was a push by many stakeholders to further 
limit the appeal categories in order to give more authority to elected decision makers and 
potentially increase the efficiency of the appeal process.   
 
Specific reductions to representation in this regard were both supported and rejected by 
stakeholder groups, including stakeholders that supported certain reductions, while not 
supporting others.  For example, limiting the types of appeal that can be filed was a common 
interest expressed among a number municipal stakeholders.177 RPCO members also supported, 
and advocated for more restrictions on certain appeal types, specifically appeals related to certain 
parts of an OP and appeals related to inclusionary zoning.178 Similarly, RCPO members 
supported limiting the power of an appeal board to overturn municipal decisions made by elected 
officials179 and suggested having an OP amendment deemed in effect or in conformity if it had 
not been approved within the legislated time limits.180  This recommendation may have led to 
further municipal decisions being implemented without any form of direct scrutiny.  Further to 
limiting appeal categories, certain stakeholders, including the FCA, supported the abolition of 
the OMB’s jurisdiction to determine what was “good planning”.181  
 
While municipal and related stakeholders supported a reduction in the matters that were 
permitted to be appealed and an increase in municipal powers, other stakeholders took an 
opposite approach. It was stated that there should not be a limit on the type of appeals which can 
be made as “there should be no automatic assumption that provincial decisions on OPs are 
inherently protective and sufficiently robust, and therefore require no further scrutiny on a public 
hearing before the OMB”.182  Additionally, caution against prohibiting appeals specifically on 
transit related issues was raised as there could be instances in which numerous provincial 
                                                             
176 Makuch, “Planning Law”, supra note 59.  
177 Grey County, “Letter”, supra note 143; Kawartha Lakes, “Letter”, supra note 143. 
178 RPCO “Reforming the OMB”, supra note 55 at 19 
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180 Ibid at 31. 
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interests, including transit-supportive density may conflict and tribunal oversight would be 
needed to ensure a just outcome is reached.183 
 
While none of the proposed reductions to appeal categories were in effect when the OMB was 
operating, the support for such a reduction appears to have stemmed from a desire of certain 
municipal stakeholders for municipalities to have more decision making authority.184  From a 
procedural fairness standpoint, the permitted categories for appeal under the OMB procedures 
provided an equal opportunity for all eligible parties to file an appeal, despite a limitation an 
third party appeals. Even if proposed reductions were implemented, a reduction in appealable 
matters before the tribunal would still provide an equal opportunity for all eligible parties to file 
an appeal. However, any reduction in the number of mechanisms to appeal a decision would 
reduce the public’s ability to take part in, and be represented by the appeals process. Further, the 
intended outcome of such a reduction would be to increase a municipality’s decision making 
authority. As a result, any municipal procedures that did not account for barriers to participation 
may result in a further reduction in representation at the tribunal.  
 
Use of Information 
 
In addition to the cost considerations associated with the production of evidence before the OMB 
discussed above, further concerns as to how information before the OMB was used were raised 
by stakeholders.  Similar to the concerns regarding limits on the types of decisions that could be 
reviewed by the OMB, the predominant issue in regards to how information was used focused on 
improving municipal efficiency and power through not permitting appeals on decisions that 
lacked democratic participation. The OMB reviewed decisions using a de novo process, which 
considered a planning application as if a previous decision had not been made, as opposed to 
solely reviewing the validity of the original decision.185  
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Certain stakeholders believed that a de novo hearing was the best way to conduct appeals, as it 
provided a “safety net” to decisions that were made for political points, instead of through a 
rationale planning process.186 In expressing this particular concern, the Ontario Home Builders 
Association (“OHBA”) cited a ZBL amendment that was unanimously refused by Toronto City 
Council despite a professional planning report recommending approval of the amendment.187 
Interviewed industry experts agreed that decisions where council has approved or rejected a 
proposal despite staff recommendations (or vice versa) did take place, and de novo hearings were 
used as a mechanism to protect against this.188   
 
However, other stakeholders believed that de novo hearings side-stepped the democratic process 
and that tribunal decisions should be based on either only the information reviewed by a 
municipality, or should only be able to overturn a municipal decision if the decision went against 
provincial planning policy. A general consensus arose from anonymous consultation submissions 
(assumed to be from members of the public) in regards to concerns over democratic decision 
making as the OMB was viewed as a “politically-appointed lever for developers”.189 While the 
OMB provided the opportunity for significant new information to be included in an appeal 
hearing at any time throughout the decision, evidence suggests this mechanism was not widely 
used.190  Several community groups supported the notion that local planning decisions should not 
be made by an administrative tribunal on the basis that a de novo hearing process can override 
democratic municipal decisions and can ignore information presented to council, in addition to 
the costs it creates due to the hiring of expert witnesses.191  
 
Both the OHBA and the RPCO stated that OMB hearing were not in fact hearings de novo, as 
there were limits on information and decisions that the tribunal could make, such as the 
requirement to “have regard to” original municipal decisions.192 Having regard to a council 
decision provided for local decision making in the appeals process, while also ensuring smart 
                                                             
186 OHBA, “Letter”, supra note 119 at 7; FRPO, “Submission”, supra note 150.  
187 OHBA, “Letter”, supra note 119 at 7. 
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planning, procedures, and no technical mistakes were followed.193 The RPCO supported focusing 
on the scope of the appeals, as opposed to the evidence being submitted and reviewed.194  
 
Apart from the costs associated with hearing evidence which de novo hearings perpetuated, a 
result of holding de novo hearings was addressing some of the imbalances of power that might 
occur between a municipality and an appellant. The tribunal would hear the decision anew and 
thus, to some extent, address any unjustified elements of a municipal decision, including any 
potential political influences on council.195 However, to the same effect, if a municipal council 
addressed considerations outside of the scope of, or conflicting with general “good planning” 
resulting in benefits to a vulnerable community, a de novo hearing also put this in jeopardy, to 
the extent the tribunal “had regard to” the original decision.  As a result of the “have regard to” 
provision of the Planning Act, how information was used by the OMB was slightly skewed in 
favour of any municipality before the tribunal if an original decision had been made. However, 
the effects of a de novo hearing provided an appeal party with genuine planning concerns a 
mechanism to combat political decisions.  
 
Alternative Dispute Settlement: 
 
Despite the small number of OMB cases that ended up using ADR methods, RCPO members 
indicated satisfaction with the cases that were settled through mediation and with many of the 
cases in which hearings were avoided.196 However, certain issues as to how mediation could be 
used were raised by other stakeholders.  Several submissions claimed that mediation could be 
used as a tactic by well-resourced parties to push up the costs of opposing parties through 
engaging in the mediation process with no intention to come to a negotiated agreement.197  In 
addition to the financial barrier associated with mediation, it was also submitted that the majority 
of files before the OMB do not settle in mediation due to the lack of incentive to come to an 
agreement, and the general nature of certain land use planning disputes (often no room for 
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negotiation).198  As a result, mediation was often not appropriate for certain complicated appeal 
issues.199  In cases that were unlikely to reach an agreeable solution via mediation, several 
stakeholders believed that requiring mediation would only increase the costs to parties.200  
However, as a result of the satisfaction that arose when mediation was successful, in addition to 
the general desire to avoid a hearing, other stakeholders supported a push to further promote or 
require mediation as part of the appeal process.201  
 
From a fairness perspective, mediation and other forms of ADR give appeal parties the 
opportunity agree to address self-identified elements of an appeal as well as focus on or submit 
any evidence they consider appropriate while also having to agree on an outcome. As a result, 
parties may chose the information used during the dispute resolution as opposed to being limited 
to what an appeals tribunal would allow. Subjectively, when participants are in control of both 
procedural and outcome elements of a decision making process, perceived fairness is often at its 
highest.202 However, the push for mandatory mediation by some stakeholders could result in 
similar barriers to participation that have resulted from the costs associated with hiring legal 
counsel and expert witnesses to meaningfully engage in the appeals process.  
 
 The ADR procedural elements were fair in that both parties played an equal role in determining 
a process and outcome. However, as indicated by stakeholders, the effects of these procedures 
had the ability to disregard inequalities of wealth and power within planning decision making 
processes, and the party with fewer resources may have been forced into making a settlement if 
ADR was attempted.203  Again, the inequitable distribution of resources, and the advantage it 
may have brought in an OMB ADR context potentially created a barrier for effective 
participation in the planning appeals process. 
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Correctability: 
 
With the exception of one, tribunal stakeholders concerned with the issue of correctability did 
not raise any concerns about the ability of the OMB to review its decisions or have questions of 
law appealed to the Divisional Court. However, the practical set-up of the OMB was raised as a 
barrier for certain stakeholders in their ability to provide evidence for an appeal to the Divisional 
Court. Without a court reporter or some other method of recording the content of an appeal 
hearing, if a dispute to a claim in a written decision arose, stakeholders had found it difficult to 
succeed on appeal.204 That appeal hearings should be recorded and available in the public record 
was also recommended as a mechanism to avoid intimidation and threats from opposing counsel 
and to improve transparency and fairness.205  
 
The issue of democratically elected officials having the ultimate authority in regards to land use 
planning decisions was also again raised in the context of correctability and was very integrated 
into the debate regarding the appropriateness of de novo hearings. Certain stakeholders supported 
the requirement of having a municipal council review all the information that is before the 
tribunal.206 Having matters sent back to the municipality to make a new decision if an appeal was 
successful and the abolishment of de novo hearings had validity to certain stakeholders, as the 
OMB process was perceived to have increased costs for participants and to have allowed 
municipalities to defer difficult decisions to the OMB.207 
 
The procedures related to reviewing or appealing a decision of the OMB applied equally to all 
appeal parties. However, the fact that appeal hearings were not recorded created the possibility 
for parties without legal representation or the resources to hire legal representation to be 
intimidated by opposing parties.  
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OMB Summary 
 
The analysis of the OMB illustrates that there are many stakeholders with competing views of 
how the appeals tribunal should have been operating.  With the exception of the requirement for 
the tribunal to “have regard to” municipal decisions, all other characteristics of the OMB that 
were analyzed applied to parties equally. While the application of these provisions were equal, 
their effect in practice highlighted several concerns with the OMB’s rules and procedures.  
 
First, the costs associated with participating in an OMB hearing were clearly prohibitive for 
certain individuals or organizations.208 The fact that potential parties could not afford either legal 
representation or expert planning advice put them at a distinct disadvantage to both participating 
meaningfully in an appeal and conveying relevant information for the tribunal to consider.209 
Additionally, cost concerns were also cited in a mediation context, as participants with fewer 
resources may have felt forced into a settlement.210 Furthermore, while not directly related to the 
issue of costs, the recording of appeal hearings was thought to potentially increase meaningful 
participation if a written decision needed to be challenged.211  
 
 Second, the role of democratic decision-makers and the extent to which their decisions should 
govern raised competing concerns. Limiting permitted appeal types, abolishing de novo hearings, 
and reviewing planning decisions only in regards to their conformity with provincial policy all 
increase the role and power of municipal councils in the decision-making process. These 
proposed amendments were usually put forward or supported by municipalities or municipally 
connected organizations, resident groups, or individual citizens.212 Conversely, maintaining the 
status quo which, at a minimum, somewhat limits the power of municipal councils was supported 
generally by public interest or organizations and industry professionals.213   
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212 ; Grey County, “Letter”, supra note 143; Kawartha Lakes, “Letter”, supra note 143; RPCO “Reforming the OMB”, supra note 
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Local Planning Appeals Tribunal 
 
Representation: 
 
Standing 
 
The two positions available for members of the public or organizations to pursue in regards to 
appeal hearings remain identical to those permitted by the OMB. An individual or organization 
may take part in an appeal either through attaining Party, or Participant status.214  However, the 
LPAT Act now limits who can participate in an oral hearing to “Parties” for all OP and ZBL 
appeals.215 Of the applicable thirteen Lexis Advance Quicklaw case studies, eight had appeal 
Participants.216 As a result of the new LPAT procedures limiting the role of appeal Participants, 
these Participants would no longer be permitted to make oral submissions in a hearing. In order 
to make an oral submission the participants must be a Party to the appeal. However, as a 
Participant, written submissions are still permitted.217  
 
In addition to the changes made to the roles of participants in the appeals process, the LPASC 
was established under Bill 139. The LPASC has a mandate to provide support services to eligible 
individuals based on financial resource respecting matters governed by the Planning Act.218 This 
includes providing free advice or legal representation at the LPAT.219 However, the provincial 
government recently announced the LPASC will no longer operate as of June 30, 2019.220  
 
Matter/Circumstance 
 
In terms of the matters that can be appealed at the LPAT, there are very few differences in 
comparison to the OMB. The LPAT still permits appeals regarding OP and ZBL decisions. For 
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example, appeal are still permitted in regards to an OP on part of, or all of a decision,221 if the 
approval authority fails to make a decision in regards to all of, or part of an OP,222 or decisions 
on private amendment requests.223 However, in addition to the limitations placed on OP appeals 
at the OMB, the LPAT has also added further limitations, such as no appeals on policies 
regarding inclusionary zoning224 or protected major transit station policies.225 Additionally, no 
appeal now lies on plans exempt from approval if the approval authority is the Minister.226 
 
In regards to ZBL appeals, under the LPAT regime, appeals are still permitted on decisions by 
council regarding the passing of a ZBL or ZBL amendment,227 the refusal of an application for a 
ZBL amendment, or when a decision is not made within a certain time period.228  However, 
similar to the changes made in respect to OP appeals, no appeal is now permitted in regards to 
policies concerning inclusionary zoning.229 
 
In terms of the circumstances under which the above matters can be appealed to the LPAT, Bill 
139 has limited the nature of certain types of appeals. The basis for an appeal to the LPAT on an 
OP or ZBL decision must be that the approval authority’s decision in regards to the OP or ZBL is 
either inconsistent with provincial policy, conflicts with or does not conform with a provincial 
plan, or fails to conform to an upper tier official plan (if applicable).230  If an OP or ZBL 
amendment was denied by the approval authority, the basis for an LPAT appeal must be both 
that the existing part of the bylaw or plan in question is inconsistent with provincial policy, 
conflicts with/does not conform with a provincial plan, or fails to conform to an upper tier 
official plan (if applicable), and that the requested amendment will remedy this inconsistency, 
conflict, or nonconformity.231 The basis for an OP or ZBL appeal can no longer be on land use 
planning grounds. 
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Use of Information 
 
Evidence  
 
Under LPAT procedures, no new evidence is permitted to be submitted during an OP or ZBL 
appeal hearing,232 as the process used by the OMB was repealed by Bill 139. Furthermore, the 
LPAT Act plainly states that during oral hearings for appeals regarding an OP, ZBL, or a failure 
to make a decision in regards to a plan of subdivision, no party or person taking part in the oral 
hearing may adduce evidence or call and examine a witness.233 
 
Under the former OMB procedures all thirteen previously analyzed Lexis Advance Quicklaw 
case studies were identified as having heard expert planning evidence from a witness during the 
hearing.234 However, when applying the new restrictive evidence requirements under the LPAT, 
none of these hearings would permit the submission of expert evidence, unless this information 
was presented to council before its decision was made.235 
 
Despite these restrictive requirements, there is still confusion in terms of if, and under what 
circumstances an expert witness can appear in front of the LPAT. For example, in the recent case 
management conference of Canadian National Railway Company v. Toronto (City), the tribunal 
itself ordered planning witnesses to appear and be examined by tribunal members during the 
upcoming hearing.236 This resulted in confusion from all parties involved, and an application to 
the Divisional Court was initiated in order to interpret several matters under the LPAT Act and 
O.Reg 102/18 in regards to calling, examining, and cross-examining witnesses - which are 
perceived to be of importance to natural justice and procedural fairness.237 Furthermore, 
interviewees cited the lack of clarity regarding procedures for certain types of appeals as causing 
confusion among tribunal stakeholders.238  
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Alternative Dispute Settlement 
 
Similar to the OMB, ADR measures under the LPAT include mediation.239 However, as a result 
of the amendments to the land use planning appeal procedures, the LPAT is required to have the 
approval authority and the appellant participate in a case management conference for all OP and 
ZBL appeals.240 It is still discretionary as to whether to participate in mediation, however, these 
measures are required to be discussed at the case management conference.241 
 
Again, the ELTO either does not track or provide the public with statistics in regards to how 
many OMB cases utilized an ADR option or took part in a pre-hearing conference. However, 
based on the twenty-three Planning Act circumstances under which the thirteen previously 
analyzed Lexis Advance Quicklaw case studies were appealed, twenty-two of the issues would 
have required a mandatory pre-hearing conference.242  
 
Correctability 
 
The LPAT is subject to the same jurisdiction and powers as the former OMB in regards to the 
ability to review and correct the decisions it makes, in that any question of law is appealable to 
the Divisional Court and that questions of fact may be internally reviewed.243   
 
However, the LPAT has slightly altered decision making authority in comparison to its former 
counterpart.  If the LPAT finds a municipal OP or ZBL decision to be inconsistent with 
provincial policy or to not conform or conflict with a provincial plan or upper-tier OP (if 
applicable), the LPAT must allow the municipality a chance to correct its decision.244 If, 
subsequent to reconsideration and submission by a municipal council, the LPAT finds that the 
decision is again inconsistent with provincial policy or does not conform or conflicts with a 
provincial plan or upper-tier OP (if applicable), the LPAT is then provided the jurisdiction to 
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approve all or part of a bylaw or plan, make modifications and approve a bylaw or plan, or issue 
an order directing a municipality to take one of these actions.245 
 
LPAT Analysis: How Does the LPAT Match-up to the OMB?  
 
The majority of OMB rules and procedures appear to have been subjectively fair for appeal 
participants. However, the OMB analysis makes evident that concerns raised by certain 
stakeholders related to the effect of tribunal procedures in practice. The consequences of these 
effects extended, or had the potential to extend to consequences beyond just procedural aspects 
and into planning equity considerations. The procedures, or proposed procedures of the OMB 
exacerbated, or had the potential to exacerbate inequalities within the planning system. As such 
the analysis of the LPAT considers whether both the procedural and equitable issues raised in 
regards to the OMB have been addressed at both the appeal and overall structural level of land 
use planning in Ontario. Similar to the OMB, the consequences of many of the rules and 
procedures of the LPAT touch upon several fairness categories and have been analyzed 
accordingly.   
 
The foremost concerns arising from the former OMB procedures were the cost barrier to 
effectively participating in an appeal hearing246 and that an increase in municipal decision 
making power, while increasing the authority of elected individuals, may result in unscrutinised 
decision making.247 This analysis demonstrates that while LPAT procedures are fair, the 
transition from the OMB to the LPAT has decreased procedural fairness in a comparative sense. 
There has been a reduction in the ability for appeal participants to seek outcomes, file an appeal, 
the ability to make oral representations at a hearing, and a restriction on considering and cross-
examining any relevant information presented subsequent to a municipal decision during an 
appeal.  
 
In terms of cost considerations raised with the planning appeal process, Bill 139 has resulted in 
the possibility for improvements as the LPASC’s mandate is to provide advice and 
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representation for eligible community members.248 However, as the LPASC is scheduled to close 
in June 2019,249 the cost concerns will likely remain. Furthermore, the LPAT procedures have 
failed to address other equity considerations while also creating new issues of its own. First, the 
Bill 139 amendments have failed to address the issue of costs associated with submitting 
evidence.250 Similarly, the issues related to an inequitable distribution of resources in an ADR or 
mediation environment have not been addressed. The new procedures have also created capacity 
issues for municipalities,251 an opportunity for proponents to submit documents that cannot be 
properly reviewed by municipal decision makers,252 no clear mechanism to directly challenge 
evidence,253 and may undermine the required increase in mandatory ADR and mediation 
discussions.254 Furthermore, LPAT procedures provide municipalities with a stronger decision 
making role. As a result, any potential imbalances in resources or influence during the decision 
making process may be exploited, as cumulatively these amendments leave the LPAT with 
limited initial decision making authority.  A summary of the analyzed Bill 139 amendments and 
the subsequent observed or anticipated consequences on the LPAT can be seen in Figure Three. 
 
 
 Anticipated Consequences of Bill 139Amendments to the LPAT 
Procedural 
Fairness Criteria 
Result of Bill 139 Amendment Observed or Anticipated Consequence 
Representation 
 
The role of a Participant has been 
limited during an appeal hearing.  
 The risk of a financial commitment is now present for anyone wishing 
to make oral representations in an appeal hearing.255   
The number of issues and the grounds 
upon which an appeal can be filed 
has been limited. 
 
 A reduction to the ability of appeal participants to seek outcomes and 
file an appeal. 
 No efficiencies resulting from this amendment have been observed as 
of yet.256  
The LPASC was established to 
provide support services to eligible 
individuals and to establish policies 
and priorities for the provision of 
these support services based on its 
financial resources. 
 Creates the ability to serve under represented populations not only at 
the appeals stage of the planning process through providing 
representation and evidence, but also by providing information and 
advice on the entire planning process.257 
 The LPASC will not be effective if potential users do not know about 
its existence.258  
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  The current interim eligibility criteria has the ability to overshadow 
certain considerations given to the characteristics of the individual or 
group attempting to bring an appeal forward. 
Use of 
Information 
The introduction of evidence has 
been restricted and is no longer 
permitted to be introduced during a 
hearing. The tribunal must make its 
decision based on the information 
that was before the original decision 
maker.  
 
 The requirement of parties to submit expert evidence prior to 
municipal council decisions likely does not reduce costs.259   
 Community members will need to be extra vigilant during all stages of 
the planning process. 
 The new evidence procedures will likely increase the workload of 
municipal employees and other professionals in the industry and 
leaves open the possibility for parties to an application to submit 
expert opinions the day before filing an appeal (on non-decisions), 
obscuring the decision making process.260 
 Eliminating the tribunal’s ability to completely review decisions anew 
places an additional amount of significant power in the hands of 
provincial and municipal decision-makers. 
The cross-examination of evidence is 
no longer permitted during an appeal 
hearing.  
 The lack of ability to challenge or ask questions of a Party’s evidence 
has the potential to result in decisions being made through relying on 
inaccurate or misleading information.261  
Case Management Conferences, are 
now mandatory for all OP and ZBL 
appeals - the possibility of ADR must 
be discussed.  
 Current available information and contextual differences make it 
difficult to understand the potential consequences. At a basic level, it is 
conceivable that more required mediation discussions may result in 
more settlements before reaching an appeal hearing. 
 The opportunity for ADR has been decreased as a result of requiring 
the appeal record be submitted to the LPAT within twenty days.262   
Correctability If an appeal is successful the LPAT 
must allow the municipality a chance 
to correct its decision. If, subsequent 
to reconsideration and submission by 
a municipal council, a further 
successful appeal is filed on the same 
matter, the LPAT may impose a 
decision by the tribunal. 
 Any potential imbalances in resources or influence during the 
municipal decision making process have no check during the appeals 
process. 
 An additional amount of significant power has been given to 
provincial and municipal decision-makers. 
Figure Three: LPAT Analysis Summary 
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Representation: 
 
When directly comparing the representation elements of the former OMB and current LPAT 
regimes, several stakeholders agree that participating in the process has become more difficult 
for individuals as a result of Bill 139.263 A specifically cited reason for the increased difficulty 
with participation is the large amount of, and costly documentation and planning evidence 
required in a short period of time at the beginning of the planning and appeal process.264 The 
most significant issue in regards to representation at the OMB was the costs, prohibiting certain 
parties’ ability to participate in an appeal hearing. The transition from the OMB to the LPAT has 
not adequately addressed these cost concerns. In comparison to the OMB, the LPAT limits 
participation opportunities in an oral hearing, while also not substantially mitigating the costs of 
taking part in an appeal.265 From both a procedural fairness and equitable stand point, this is 
problematic.  
 
Limiting participation: 
 
The procedural amendment permitting only Parties to participate in an oral hearing for OP and 
ZBL appeals266 will likely have important repercussions. This representation limitation will now 
require a potential financial commitment from anyone wishing to take part in an appeal hearing, 
as parties to an appeal can be held liable for costs.267 It was acknowledged that previously the 
OMB did not want to deter members of the public from filing appeals by issuing cost awards 
against then, and that adverse cost awards rarely took place unless a Party’s conduct was 
vexatious or frivolous.268  However, it was also specified by several stakeholders that the 
potential threat of an adverse cost award could likely hinder, or cause a Party to abandon its 
opposition.269  Furthermore, significant voices in the planning process may be weakened or lost 
as a result of this amendment. For example, a large community association and the Provincial 
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Transit Agency were participating in an appeal which recently held a case management 
conference before the LPAT.270 In this case management conference, it was established that 
these two organizations were Participants, not Parties to the appeal.271 As a result of the Bill 139, 
both organizations were restricted in regards to participation in the appeal hearing.272 However, 
each did agree to be available to answer questions for the tribunal if needed.273 
 
Similarly, the new procedures of the LPAT have reduced a participant’s ability to appeal a 
decision in regards to both the provisions of the Planning Act that permit an appeal and the 
content of each appeal. Limiting the basis for filing an appeal with the LPAT on an OP or ZBL 
decision to matters of being consistent with provincial policy, conflicting with, or not 
conforming with a provincial plan, or failing to conform to an upper tier official plan (if 
applicable)274 reduces the opportunities for a decision to be appealed.   
 
Appellants are unable to appeal the same number of issues as was permitted under the previous 
regime. Of the applicable thirteen Lexis Advance Quicklaw case studies, eight were identified as 
specifically taking into account land use planning considerations during the decision making 
process.275  An appeal under the LPAT regime will not take these considerations into account. 
This reduction in the appeal rights limits all parties’ ability to take part in, and influence, the land 
use planning system. One interviewee, however indicated that the impacts of this change is 
exaggerated, as the vast majority of OMB hearings relied on a policy basis, not exclusively 
planning grounds for appeal decisions and that generalized planning impacts carried little weight 
in the appeals process unless there was an additional policy basis.276 However, as “land use 
planning grounds” are no longer an appealable matter, there has been a reduction to the ability 
for appeal participants to file an appeal, for which there now is a much higher threshold in 
regards to OP and ZBL appeals than under the OMB.277  While sending a decision back to 
council to reconsider may allow for further representation in the planning process, as is discussed 
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later in this paper, it is questionable whether that outcome will result from the Bill 139 
amendments.  
 
While increasing the participation and the voices of community members was a stated goal of 
OMB reform, so too was creating a faster, more efficient appeals process.278 Reducing appeal 
types and the ability to participate is a clear attack on representation within the appeals process, 
but it may potentially be justified under timeliness and efficiency considerations. Thus far 
however, this justification does not appear to be evident. As a consequence of the amendments, 
in order to ensure an appeal has been filed with appropriate justifications, an appeal must be 
validated through a preliminary hearing before it can progress onto the appeal hearing stage.279 
This preliminary screening must happen within ten days of the tribunal receiving notice of the 
appeal.280 The validity exercise evaluates both if the existing provision(s) the OP or ZLB in 
question are inconsistent with provincial policy, do not conform or conflict with a provincial 
plan or upper-tier OP (if applicable) and if a proposed amendment or change does conform to 
provincial policy and is consistent or does not conflict with provincial plans or upper-tier OP (if 
applicable).281  
 
An anticipated consequence of limiting the types of appeals and holding preliminary screenings 
to determine the validity of appeals was intended to be a reduction in the number of appeals that 
were brought forward without merit. However, in the limited number of LPAT preliminary 
screening hearings that have taken place to date, an interviewee has observed a different 
outcome.  At the point in time that the LPAT is to make its determination on the validity of an 
appeal, the tribunal does not have the benefit of the information contained in the appeal record. 
As such, it appears as though the LPAT is hesitant to stop an appeal at this early stage. An 
example of this reluctance is seen clearly in Gravelle v. Stone Mills (Town) quoted below:  
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“[62]The exercise involves a judgment which, due to its early stage 
engagement, will necessarily often proceed on more limited background and 
therefore call for a perhaps less critical analysis, on the premise that the 
statutorily compliant superficial assertion should be afforded the subsequent 
opportunity to be more fully explained and borne out with the benefit of the 
more expansive evidence and analysis which forms part of the full hearing 
process. 
 
[63] This does not mean to say that an appellant will meet the statutory tests 
merely by mimicking the language of the section and making the bald 
declarations of consistency and conformity required. These assertions must 
be connected, in the Notice of Appeal, to facts that will take the Tribunal to 
a reasonable conclusion that there are live issues of consistency and 
conformity in the appeal.”282  
 
While the LPAT procedural amendments limit the representation of individuals and parties in the 
appeals process by both restricting who can participate in oral hearings and what types of issues 
can be appealed, the effects of these limitations is yet to be seen. After observation of 
approximately six LPAT preliminary hearings, an interviewee noted that while the validation 
process is meant to distinguish appeals with no merit, there has been an unwillingness to do so 
thus far.283 Similarly in the context of the Dutch planning appeals process, when representation 
process elements were reduced through limiting who was able to file an appeal, there was no 
reduction in the number of appeals filed subsequent to the changes being made.284 However, it is 
still early in the transition stage between the OMB and the LPAT and efficiencies may become 
apparent once a larger time period can be analyzed.  
 
In terms of procedural fairness, while the LPAT applies its procedures respecting participation 
equally across all parties and participants, in comparison to the OMB these characteristics have 
been weakened. There has been a reduction on the ability for appeal participants to seek 
outcomes and file an appeal and the ability to make oral representations at an appeal hearing. 
Furthermore, a financial commitment is now required from anyone wishing to make oral 
representations in an appeal hearing, which has the potential to exacerbate the already significant 
cost concerns raised in regards to participating in an OMB appeal hearing.  
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Costs:  
 
The LPAT has established several new procedures and policies that will likely effect the cost of 
an appeal hearing for the parties involved, which was a major concern under the previous OMB 
regime. The majority of these policies impact the tribunal’s use of information and are discussed 
later in this paper. In terms of the costs associated with representation, the effects of the LPASC 
mandate to represent eligible parties at the LPAT are still largely unknown. Established under 
Bill 139, the LPASC has a mandate to both provide support services, including free advice and 
representation at appeal hearings to eligible individuals.285 As a result of the recent decision to 
abolish the LPASC, its impact on addressing cost concerns during the appeal process will likely 
never be fully understood.  
 
When looking at the equity concerns raised by the general planning and appeal processes, the 
LPASC has the ability to serve underrepresented populations not only at the appeals stage of the 
planning process through providing representation and evidence, but also by providing 
information and advice on the entire planning process.286 
 
A general consensus (although not unanimous support) among stakeholders is that funding 
assistance for eligible individuals and organizations to take part in the appeals process enhances 
fairness and allow for meaningful perspectives to be heard.287 However, to ensure access to 
Ontario’s land use planning system for many different individuals, there is a need to have the 
LPASC’s eligibility criteria as expansive as possible.288   
 
The current interim eligibility criteria for LPASC services include three categories: the context 
of the planning application or appeal; the circumstances of the individual or group; and the 
nature and extent of public interest.289  While now a moot point due to its upcoming 
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decommission, the LPASC’s current interim eligibility criteria’s focus on the jurisdiction and 
merits of the planning problem brought forward, has the ability to overshadow certain 
considerations given to the characteristics of the individual or group attempting to bring an 
appeal forward. A specific criteria consideration states that “one’s ability to contribute to the 
costs of experts if needed” will influence who is eligible to be represented.290 As confirmed by 
the LPASC, this criteria may be viewed as a positive or negative indicator when determining 
eligibility.291 If the lack of ability to contribute resources to planning expertise is viewed as a 
negative eligibility consideration, the LPASC will not have addressed the issue of inaccessibility 
to the appeal system as a result of cost.  One interviewee also believes that whether the LPASC 
agrees to be retained on a particular issue could signal to both the tribunal and the opposing party 
that the case has merit, and could cause issues for how a case is perceived and addressed from 
the beginning of the appeal process.292  
 
Additionally, in order to be eligible for representation, required steps in the planning process 
must have been previously completed, such as participating in the public input process, and 
abiding by the required deadlines.293  Several interviewees believe that in order for the LPASC to 
have been truly effective, it must advertise so that the members of the public that could benefit 
from its services will become aware of its existence.294  Furthermore, as discussed subsequently 
in this paper, there has been a substantial increase to the importance of submissions to municipal 
councils prior to an appeal being filed. As a result, LPASC support and services will likely be 
required more extensively earlier in the planning process, further increasing the significance of 
ensuring the public is aware of the Centre and how to access its services.295 Without the LPASC 
providing services to individuals prior to a council decision, its overall impact on Ontario’s 
planning appeal system will be limited. If the LPASC manages to address these issues, they will 
once again arise as of June 30, 2019, when the LPASC ceases operations.    
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While the LPASC has the potential to address the financial barriers to legal experts and services 
for low-income and underrepresented populations, thus far there is no evidence it has addressed 
the issue. Additionally, as the Support Centre will be abolished in June, it is unlikely that the 
issue of financial barriers in the appeal system will be removed.  As the LPASC is not actually a 
procedural element of the LPAT, it is not formally analysed in this paper in terms of its fairness 
elements. It is suffice to suggest that as access to the LPASC’s services and representation has 
not been equal to all parties that its fairness elements are deficient. However, in terms of 
equitable considerations,  the LPASC does not favour those who are already better off and offers 
treatment is “appropriate” instead of equal. Therefore the LPASC certainly appears to be able to 
meet equity requirements, so long as the eligibility criteria are drafted to do so and assistance is 
timed appropriately to have a meaningful impact on planning outcomes.  
 
Use of Information 
 
In terms of both procedural justice and equity considerations regarding the use of information, 
the LPAT has thus far failed to address, or raised new fairness concerns as to those found at the 
OMB.  The two significant underlying issues in regards to the use of information identified in the 
OMB analysis were the costs associated with the process, and the ability for the tribunal to 
overturn a democratic decision.  The costs associated with a Party participating in an appeal, 
such as hiring legal counsel or planning experts led to the inability to participate for many who 
sought to take part in an appeal hearing.296 If one were to take part in a hearing without seeking 
assistance from experts, the chances of a successful outcome for that participant were 
weakened.297  Furthermore the former appeals process gave the tribunal the ability to overturn a 
council decision, which was viewed by many stakeholders as the product of a democratic 
process.298 The Province attempted to remedy both these and efficiency concerns by not 
permitting the introduction of evidence into appeal hearings, unless that information was 
presented before a municipal council during its original decision.299  
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Costs 
 
The costs of an appeal hearing will decrease because of the Bill 139 amendments. However, an 
analysis of the data collected suggests that the costs of the overall decision making process may 
be equivalent, or even increase in comparison to that of the OMB.300 For example, under the 
OMB regime, legal counsel and expert opinion evidence were routinely only assembled once a 
municipal decision was made and it was clear that an appeal would be initiated.301 However, due 
to the nature of the new appeal system, if a party hopes to be successful in an appeal should one 
arise, it is now critical to ensure that all potentially relevant information, including expert 
planning reports and evidence are submitted to municipal councils before a decision is made.302   
 
Therefore, if parties to a potential appeal would like to bring forward certain evidence, the costs 
associated with preparing expert opinions and planning reports must be incurred before a 
planning decision, regardless of if an appeal will actually arise.303 Due to the nature and 
uncertainty of council decisions, in order to have a likely chance of success should an appeal 
arise, submitting evidence of a position before council is essential.304  This view was also shared 
by certain stakeholders. In its OMB consultation submission, the Canadian Environmental Law 
Association (“CELA”) stated that a consequence of limiting the evidence available to the 
tribunal to the information that was before council was that additional expenses would be 
incurred by clients during the early stages of a planning application process, as experts would 
need to be retained at this stage.305 
 
As a result, participants have three options in regards to preparing for a council decision on a 
planning matter. The first is not prepare an expert report and hope for a favourable council 
decision. However, if council’s decision is unfavourable, the participant must accept the 
consequences of not having any expert evidence to support an appeal. The second option is to 
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incur the upfront costs of providing an expert report that council may consider as a part of its 
decision. While resources are expended, there will be evidence for the LPAT to consider if an 
appeal arises. The final option is to not prepare an expert submission and either submit an 
individually prepared report, or another form of submission.  As previously discussed, if no 
expert reports are submitted for consideration to the municipality, the impact that can be made on 
an appeal is limited.306  
 
The consequences of this amendment are likely to be significant to the appeals process on 
multiple levels. For one, it will require community members and groups to be very active within 
all stages of planning process as opposed to under the OMB model, where it was satisfactory to 
simply make any form of submission to council or during a public meeting and then file an 
appeal.307  While making any form of submission is still the permitted threshold to file an 
appeal,308 if no tangible evidence is put before council to form part of the appeal record, it will 
likely result in an unfavourable appeal outcome.309 Historically, the OMB was criticized for its 
complicated structure, inaccessibility, and lack of user friendly processes.310 The requirement to 
submit expert evidence before every potentially controversial planning decision may likely lead 
to further confusion with the process and an overall reduction in appeal participation, due to the 
expense required.311  
 
Second, there has been expressed concern, specifically from small municipalities that the new 
evidence procedures will increase the workload of municipal employees.312 For example, the 
documentation of the day-to-day operations of a municipal planning department regarding an 
application must now be prepared in such a way as to anticipate an LPAT hearing, which is 
resource intensive.313 Similarly, the new procedure leaves open the possibility for parties to an 
application to submit expert opinions the day before filing for appeal (on non-decisions), 
obscuring the decision making process.314  
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In addition to the front-ending of the costs associated with filing evidence, there are also 
practical concerns related to using the best available information for decision-making under the 
LPAT regime.  In order to make the best decision possible, the tribunal must have access to the 
best available, and most relevant evidence, including information that may have become 
available subsequent to the original decision.315 According to CELA, there should not be a 
presumption or expectation that a provincial or municipal decision is correct.316 As such, 
eliminating the tribunal’s ability to completely review decisions anew with additional evidence 
places an increased amount of significant power in the hands of provincial and municipal 
decision-makers.   
 
Interviewees agree that not only is the inability to submit relevant evidence problematic, but the 
lack of ability to test the evidence submitted through cross-examination is a substantial reduction 
to ensuring accurate and credible planning information in being used.317 Having attended a 
public hearing before council in relation to a planning proposal, one interviewee stated that the 
proponent of a proposal brought many consultants who provided evidence that was assumed to 
be true by council.318 Furthermore, the consultants were given an opportunity to respond to 
community member concerns.  However the public was not permitted to respond to proponent 
evidence.319 The ability for proposals to now be approved with no substantiation of planning 
evidence or cross-examination to deal with potential assumptions or inadequacies in the evidence 
provides a steep departure from how information was used at the OMB.   
 
Similar to the OMB, the LPAT applies its use of information procedures equally across all 
appeal participants, resulting in a fair process. However, in comparison to the OMB, limiting the 
appeal record to information that was submitted to council creates the possibility that relevant 
information acquired subsequent to a municipal decision cannot be considered by the LPAT on 
appeal. Similarly, the inability to cross-examine evidence at all may result in decisions being 
                                                             
315 CELA, “OMB Submission”, supra note 4. 
316 Ibid, at 10.  
317 Confidential Interview Number 2, 4, 5. 
318 Confidential Interview Number 5 
319 Ibid.  
How Does the LPAT Match-up? A Comparative Analysis of Ontario’s Current and Former Land Use Planning Appeal Board 
 
 59 
  
based on inaccurate information.320 As a result, the OMB procedures regarding the use of 
evidence were, in terms of subjective fairness, more just than the current procedures of the 
LPAT.  In terms of equitable considerations that arose from the OMB in regards to submitting 
evidence, the LPAT also has failed to address the underlying issue of cost, which was a highly 
relevant factor.  While failing to address the issue of costs, the LPAT has also created a workload 
issue for municipalities and an opening for development proponents to submit documents that 
cannot be properly reviewed by municipal decision makers,321 further impacting the proper use 
of information in decision-making.   
 
Alternative Dispute Settlement: 
 
While there was relative satisfaction with dispute resolution mechanisms under the OMB, a 
small amendment was made to the appeal procedures which now requires mediation to be 
discussed in mandatory case management conferences for certain types of appeals.322  
Understanding the impact of mandatory ADR discussions in required case management 
conferences will need to be studied in-depth. However, based on the initial analysis of the 
twenty-three Planning Act circumstances under which the thirteen OMB Lexis Advance 
Quicklaw case studies were appealed, twenty-two of the issues would have required a mandatory 
pre-hearing conference where mandatory mediation discussions take place.323 Prior to the LPAT 
being established only five cases totaling nine issues participated in a case management 
conference.324 Whether these required discussions will be successful in achieving fair and just 
outcomes for both parties’ remains to be seen.  
 
Of the five Lexis Advance Quicklaw case studies that held a case management conference, only 
one went to board assisted mediation.325 Two of the case studies reached a settlement or partial 
settlement,326 however it is unknown what the effect of the pre-hearing conference was, as two 
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other cases also reached a settlement without any indication of holding such a conference.327 The 
case that used mediation was inclusive of the three that reached a settlement.328  From this small 
sample size it is difficult to draw any conclusions as to whether case management conferences 
and mediation in Ontario’s land use planning appeals context results in fewer hearings. However, 
increasing the number of case management conferences will increase the number of disputes 
required to discuss settlements and ADR, and thus an increase in the potential for appeal parties 
to control their own process and outcomes.  
 
When looking at other jurisdictions with court systems or administrative tribunals that also 
adjudicate land use planning appeals (although not necessarily on similar grounds), further 
conclusions can be drawn as to the potential outcomes of required mediation discussions. For 
example, the New South Wales Land and Environment Court (which hears land use appeals, but 
not exclusively) saw a consistent increase over four years in settlement rates for those cases in 
which mediation was conducted, with rates of 58%, 64%, 70%, and 80% respectively between 
1998 and 2002.329  However, within this same time period, the number of cases that actually 
conducted a mediation dropped from fifty-two to ten.330  The American Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service provided ADR services to an average of 1099 mediations between the years 
of 2013 and 2017 and consistently reached a settlement on 44%-50% of hearings.331  It is 
difficult to compare the success rates of these two institutions with those of the LPAT due to a 
number of contextual differences, not least of which being the fact that requiring mediation be 
discussed does not necessitate that mediation will take place. However, it is conceivable that 
more required mediation discussions may result in more settlements before reaching an LPAT 
appeal hearing.  As ADR provides a forum in which both parties can agree to bring forward any 
information in any manner and come to a preferred outcome, both representative and 
informational elements of the procedure can be determined by the parties. While often increasing 
the efficiency of the dispute resolution process, mediation also allows procedural fairness 
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elements to be chosen directly by the users of the system, which is the ideal method to ensure 
perceived fairness among users.332 
 
However, an interviewee suggests that by limiting the appeal record to the information 
considered by municipal councils and by requiring it be submitted to the LPAT within a 20 day 
timeframe,333 the opportunity for ADR and mediation has actually decreased, or at the very least 
is not actively encouraged.334  The practical effects of requiring an appeal record to be supplied 
to the LPAT within 20 days of an appeal is that all Parties are worried about meeting the appeal 
record deadlines, resulting in missed opportunities for ADR.335 Even if a settlement is agreed to 
at the outset, parities must still file a case synopsis and appeal record within 20 days,336 and a 
case management conference is still required.337 To create the appeal record and case synopsis, 
both parties will likely hire planning experts and build adversarial cases against the other(s), 
instead of using this time as a potential opportunity to avoid an expensive hearing and find 
common ground.338 The estimated cost for many parties to complete an appeal record is up to 
$30,000.339 The appeal record and case management conference timing requirements 
disincentives any preliminary mediation discussions and by the time a case management 
conference is held, expenses have already been incurred, and parties often do not want to risk 
“backing down” from something placed on the record.340  Additionally, once both parties have 
exposed their respective appeal records, often each opposing party may disagree with portions of 
content or determine weaknesses within each record, thus further reducing the likelihood of 
mediation.341  Finding common ground to mediate after appeal records are released can be 
difficult.   
 
Similar to the OMB, when participants are in control of both procedural and outcome elements 
of a decision making process, as they are during LPAT ADR procedures, perceived fairness is 
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often at its highest.342 Additionally, the LPAT procedures in regards to case management 
conferences and discussing ADR possibilities are applied evenly across all appeal Parties. 
However, the issue raised by stakeholders in regards to the potential effect of OMB procedures 
forcing a party participating in ADR with fewer resources into making a settlement was not 
addressed by Bill 139 amendments. The inequitable distribution of resources, and the advantage 
it may have brought in an OMB ADR context are still present in the LPAT ADR process. 
Further, LPAT timeline procedures appear to undermine the increased mandatory ADR and 
mediation discussions as appeal records and case synopses have already been filed before these 
required discussions take place.343   
 
Correctability: 
 
“The OMB serve[ed] as an important check on ill-advised exercise of 
municipal discretion… such as approving questionable or incomplete 
development applications.” 344 
 
As previously discussed, many of the changes to the land use planning appeal system 
implemented by the LPAT were designed specifically to address concerns raised at the OMB 
about tribunal deference towards democratic municipal council decisions. This justification is 
used specifically in regards the LPAT procedures requiring the Tribunal to only consider 
evidence that was submitted before a municipal council and to sending a decision resulting in a 
successful appeal back to a municipal council for a second chance to make an appropriate 
decision.345    
 
There appears to be significant confusion in regards to whether a municipality will be required to 
re-engage constituents with a public meeting if the LPAT determines there is a conformity issue 
with an original municipal decision and sends the OP or ZBL application back to a municipal 
council. In this regard, interviewees gave conflicting remarks, stating both that a further public 
meeting is and is not required, or admitting to not knowing the extent of the requirement, as the 
provision of the Planning Act are unclear.346 However, there is agreement that there is no 
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prohibition on a subsequent public meeting once an application is sent back to council for 
reconsideration.347 Additionally, there is agreement among interviewees that if the statutory 
public engagement process were to be engaged, the opportunity to hold a public meeting and 
collect and interpret data is possible, but likely to be limited as the timeline for reconsidering a 
decision is only ninety days.348  As a result, it is expected that sending a decision back to council 
will have minimal impact on the representation, input, or ability to correct a decision for 
members of the public. However, there is a large benefit to municipalities, as it allows for 
another chance to conform to provincial policy without the threat of the tribunal imposing a 
result.349   
 
Allowing municipalities a second chance at conformity on a private amendment, without 
requiring public input, or requiring the entire new decision process, including a public input 
process is giving a second chance at meeting provincial requirements without the need to 
consider other criteria that might be significant to certain stakeholders. So long as the 
municipality in question can host a public meeting (if required) and make any decision that 
conforms to upper level planning documents, the decision will be deemed to have been made.350 
The decision may be vastly different than what was applied for, due to the broad nature of 
provincial and certain official plans. However, if the decision conforms, or does not conflict, it 
will be final and binding with no further appeal options.  The example given by one interviewee 
was that a 20 storey apartment building may have been proposed, but a 30 storey building may 
be approved by council and not be appealable to the LPAT so long as it conforms to the required 
provincial planning documents, regardless of the planning rationale put forward in the 
application.351  
 
The rule requiring a decision be sent back to council is designed to address municipal deference 
during the appeals process, as there was a concern from certain stakeholders that the OMB is re-
writing policy instead of sticking to a formal dispute resolution role.352 However, an interviewee 
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insists that the tribunal has always given deference to municipal councils.353 As a result of s.2(1) 
of the Planning Act, the OMB was required to “have regard for” municipal decisions and only 
departed from a council decision if it was not well rationalized.354  When a municipal decision 
was overturned it was simply a countering of political decisions made by councils without proper 
planning grounds.355  
 
There was a belief among certain stakeholders that de novo hearings were a “balanced, evidence 
based, and a long-term view of local planning decisions”, particularly when it came to 
encouraging mixed-income and purpose built rental housing356 and permitting cross-
examination.357 Without a process that reviews a planning decision in its entirety, there is a belief 
that community opposition may be a barrier to this type of development.358 In fact the Federation 
of Rental-housing Providers of Ontario states that “without a neutral, non-political appeal body, 
many purpose built rental applications would not proceed.”359 Similarly, the OHBA expressed an 
appreciation for the fact that de novo hearings provided a check point to local politicians who 
made decisions in terms of seeking re-election, instead of what constituted “appropriate” 
development.360 Yet, the decision to allow municipal councils the opportunity to reconsider a 
decision that did not align with provincial policy gives municipalities an unmatched amount of 
power in the planning system. As a result, any inequalities, political influence, or bias present in 
municipal decision making will again be present at the appeal level, without a mechanism to 
address these issues.   
 
Sending a decision back to municipal councils does not guarantee the ability of members of the 
public to have any additional input into a new decision. However, it does provide an opportunity 
for a procedure that ensures increased representation and fair participation from the community.  
Susan Fainstein acknowledges that typical urban policies are under the control of pro-growth 
regimes and benefit the advantaged in society while hurting the disadvantaged.361 The process 
                                                             
353 Interview 1, supra note 18. 
354 Ibid. 
355 Ibid.  
356 FRPO, “Submission”, supra note 150 at 4. 
357 Interview 5, supra note 5. 
358 FRPO, “Submission”, supra note 150 at 4. 
359 Ibid at 10.  
360 OHBA, “Letter”, supra note 119 at 7. 
361 Fainstein, “Just City”, supra note 3. 
How Does the LPAT Match-up? A Comparative Analysis of Ontario’s Current and Former Land Use Planning Appeal Board 
 
 65 
  
changes to Ontario’s land use planning appeal system, while providing a process that gives 
members of the public a second chance at participation, will likely have minimum to little impact 
on the planning system overall due to short timelines and uncertainties relating to public input 
requirements.362 This lack of impact is further emphasized if the original public participation 
methods used by municipalities are applied in such a way as to benefit the advantaged, which, as 
discussed below, can be the case. Democratizing the planning process does provide a more 
transparent form of decision making, however, the process is not necessarily equitable.363  
 
While many municipal (and some neighbourhood) stakeholders supported a stronger decision 
making role for municipalities, there are potential procedural and equitable consequences to both 
the planning appeal regime and the planning system overall.  The ability for a municipality to be 
both a Party to an appeal and to unilaterally create a new outcome as a result of a successful 
appeal sent back to council falls far short of the perceived fairness standard set by the OMB.  
Now that the LPAT must send a decision back to council, any potential imbalances in resources 
or influence during the decision making process has no check and the municipality is solely 
responsible for ensuring equity is considered.  
 
 
A Closer Look at Equity Considerations within Ontario’s Planning System 
 
“The OMB has become more than an appeal body; it has become a fundamental part of 
Ontario’s land use planning system.”364 
 
As distinct elements of Ontario’s land use planning system, the requirements for participating in 
the process prior and subsequent to a land use decision do not significantly overlap. However, as 
discussed, the impacts of one system on the other can be substantial.  Prior to the appeal tribunal 
amendments, to participate in an appeal hearing, there was a requirement to make submissions 
prior to the decision, or be granted the ability to participate if the tribunal determined it was 
reasonable.365 Additionally, municipal and provincial decision makers were statutorily required 
to hold a public meeting for input on planning documents and development decisions.366 Input 
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received for public input mechanisms would be considered when a municipality was making a 
planning decision. In response, the tribunal would “have regard to” the municipal decision 
during an appeal.367 However, the extent to which public input was and is used effectively is 
debated. This process remains in effect under the LPAT regime.  
 
To understand the impact of the planning appeal regime on the planning system overall, the 
interests which the tribunal’s procedures and rules serve must be analyzed. As a result of the 
OMB analysis, it is evident that there were several disagreements on aspects regarding what 
matters should be appealable, how evidence should be heard, and how appeals should be 
decided.  A look at the positions of the stakeholders who participated in the tribunal review 
process in regards to the key changes discussed above provides an insight into the effect of the 
amendments on the planning system. While not unanimous in any situation, an analysis of what 
elements of the appeal regime changes stakeholders’ support is telling. For example, limiting the 
types of appeal that can be filed was a common interest expressed among a coalition of 
municipal or related stakeholders.368 The reduction in the grounds upon which a decision can be 
appealed effectively insulates many decisions from appeal. If a decision is appealed, the upside 
to a municipality is large, as the conformity test burden for an appellant to meet may be 
challenging.369 Similarly, remitting matters back to council gives a municipality a second chance 
at “appeal-proofing” a decision. It is important to note that certain municipalities were in favour 
of a more transparent and accountable appeals system, such as that of the previous OMB and did 
not support limiting how and what appeals could be brought forward.370 However, overall, it is 
apparent that municipalities had their interests favoured in the procedural changes to the LPAT. 
As discussed later in this section, this increase in municipal power potentially leaves land use 
decisions more vulnerable to pro-growth influences at the expense of certain community 
members.    
 
The amendments implemented by Bill 139 were directed at the appeals process, although several 
changes have indirect impacts on the planning system overall. While several LPAT policies 
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reduced the level of perceived procedural fairness in comparison to its former counterpart, this 
portion of the paper will specifically focus on the role of these amendments in regards to 
potentially perpetuating the systemic or procedural equity issues that were identified as issues at 
the OMB. Many of the major amendments to the appeals process resulted in one similar 
outcome: municipal decision making has been given increased deference and power.  
 
As a result, municipal decision making processes now have a larger influence on both how an 
appeal can proceed and on its outcome. Three of the most significant amendments to the appeals 
process in this regard are:  
 
(1) limiting appeal types and the grounds upon which an appeal can be filed;  
(2) limiting the permitted evidence in appeal hearings to that which was considered by 
council without the opportunity for cross-examination; and  
(3) remitting successful appeal matters back to council for a second chance at a decision.  
 
The LPASC has the potential to alleviate some of the inequalities found within the planning 
system in relation to financial barriers, however, with its impending closure this cannot be 
analyzed. The further changes made to the land use planning appeals regime appear to have 
created an environment in which inequities within the overall planning system can remain and 
potentially flourish. Many of the amendments imposed by Bill 139 and discussed in this paper, 
while attempting to address certain concerns raised by stakeholders, were geared towards equal 
treatment, as opposed to appropriate treatment of tribunal users. As a result, many of the 
inequities present in the previous appeals model have not been addressed through the 
amendments to the process.  
 
The matters, individuals, and influences that each council considers in its decision making will 
and do vary in different municipalities under different contexts. For example, in its joint 
submission, the Cities of Thunder Bay, Sault Ste. Marie, Greater Sudbury, North Bay, and 
Timmins stated that the issues of the south do not generally apply to these northern 
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municipalities, which have issues of their own.371  However, all individuals and municipalities 
will have a role of greater significance as a result of the increased incentive to lobby, or form an 
agreement with council prior to a decision being made.372 This increased incentive stems from 
the Bill 139 amendments, which make the act of overturning an original municipal decision 
much more challenging, and at times impossible due to the provincial conformity standard.   
 
The Increase in Municipal Power and its Potential Influences: 
 
Inherently, as the number of appeals and the grounds upon how a decision can be appealed are 
restricted, one’s ability to take part in the planning system are reduced.  A consequence of 
empowering authorities to make non-appealable decisions is that much more weight and 
significance is put on municipal decisions. Similarly, if decisions are only appealable on 
conformity grounds with provincial and upper level planning documents, the importance of 
participating in, and understanding the content of these documents is increased for the planning 
system as a whole. Furthermore, the inability to present new evidence in an appeal hearing 
requires increased knowledge of the planning process and potential financial commitments to 
participate throughout the whole process.373 Without an opportunity to cross-examine any 
evidence submitted, a municipal decision may also be based on uncorroborated or inadequate 
information.374 Finally, allowing municipalities a second chance at conforming to provincial 
policies, at its very best reinforces current municipal decision making practices.  
 
While these amendments significantly impact the initial stages of the planning process, no 
changes were made in regards to how one can participate in the planning process before a 
decision is made. This stage of the planning process, however, has now become a pivotal time in 
regards to one’s ability to both influence a decision and an appeal.  Although many 
municipalities engage in much larger public input processes for both OP and ZBL drafting, there 
is still only a requirement to hold one public meeting.375  As has been previously researched, the 
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type of public participation required from and often used by municipal decision makers can lead 
to unjust outcomes.376   
 
While municipal councils are accountable to the public for decisions that it makes through 
democratic elections, the effects of developers and real estate values has been documented on 
how Ontario municipal council land use decisions are made.377 As such, despite democratically 
elected municipal voices being more powerful in this new planning context, concerns still exist 
in terms of council influence. If land value continues to be a revenue driver for municipal 
budgets and if developers continue to engage councils prior to and throughout the entire planning 
process while individuals or community groups are effectively priced out of, or subjected to a 
complicated and robust planning process, outcomes may favour municipal, developer, or pro-
growth interests. 
 
Municipal revenue is generated from a number of sources, such as user fees or transfers from 
other levels of government.378 However, the majority of revenue is generated through local 
property taxes. User fees and government transfers funds are often allocated for specific 
purposes, whereas a municipal council has the ability to budget property tax revenue as it deems 
appropriate. Approximately 42% of local tax revenues in Canada come from property tax.379  
Property tax is directly related to the assessed property value of a piece of land. As a result, local 
governments have an interest in either increasing the value of current tax producing parcels of 
land, or developing more land in order to increase the tax base.380 Increasing the value of land 
can be accomplished through several mechanisms, including subdividing and zoning a 
property.381 In addition to the municipal benefits of increased land value, individual property 
owners also have a proprietary interest in increasing the value of their land. As a result, planning 
applications seeking development and investment are commonplace. As mentioned previously, 
lower-income neighbourhoods often require higher service levels while contributing less to the 
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local tax base, resulting in municipal attempts to attract new investment and tax sources to 
existing lower-income areas while attempting to limit any expansion.382 
 
In addition to municipal revenue generation, additional pro-growth interests can influence 
council decision making. An analysis of the 2006 Ontario municipal elections shows that in 80% 
of municipalities studied, the development industry was the most significant council campaign 
finance contributor.383 In fact, of all elected candidates across the region, 45.2% of funding came 
from corporations.384 Of the corporations that could be identified, 65% of all corporate donations 
were from either developers or companies related to the development industry.385 This number 
declined significantly for unsuccessful candidates, whereas funding from other sources stayed 
relatively consistent.386 Over 33% of successful candidates reported that 75% of their campaign 
finances came from corporations387 and 47% of elected ward-based regional councillors were 
financed by the only development industry financing within that ward.388  
 
Funding from members of the public across successful and unsuccessful candidates was found to 
suggest that a range of viewpoints is supported by the public.389 However, successful candidates 
generally supported similar values to their corporate financers390 and often voted in favour of 
financer development applications.391 This influence by developers on the decision-making 
fabric of Ontario municipalities can play an indirect role in determining how planning 
applications are considered by attempting to reinforce a council ideology based on development, 
growth, and land values. Therefore, any increase in municipal council decision making powers 
has the potential to increase the influence of the develop industry on the planning system overall.  
 
Other examples of developers attempting to exert influence have been observed in other 
municipalities across the province and country. For example, the family of the Mayor of Caledon 
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was the victim of several threats and intimidation from development industry associates in 
relation to a proposed zoning bylaw amendment.392 Further, prior to Calgary’s 2013 municipal 
election, prominent developers contributed to the “training” of several candidates and did not 
contribute to the incumbent mayor’s municipal campaign, as a result of different views on 
growth.393 In a system that inherently favours growth and development, land developer’s direct 
and powerful influences on municipal councils creates a situation in which growth interests may 
outweigh community input, as community input mechanisms often fail in a variety of aspects.  
 
Ontario’s planning legislation requires opportunities for citizen involvement in the planning 
process. Often municipalities go beyond what is legislatively mandated.394 However, the 
deficiencies in regards to how public input is acquired and considered has been previously 
researched and provides a mechanism for system inequities to take hold.  Particularly, current 
public input requirements are criticized for not ensuring a diverse range of viewpoints are being 
heard, specifically in regards to marginalized individuals within the community.395 Public 
meetings generally attract only those with specific interests in regards to the planning matter at 
issue.396 Furthermore, it has been suggested that the lack of knowledge in regards to the 
requirements around public input mechanisms into Ontario’s planning system serves as a barrier 
to participating in the system.397 With the requirement to now have all evidence before council 
prior to a decision being made, this becomes an even more significant issue.  
 
Legislated public meetings have been viewed as a formality by both members of the public and 
the officials conducting the meetings, in the sense that planning tools are often drafted in a non-
negotiated process.398 By the time a public meeting is held, there is no “will” to formally 
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consider public comments.399 This system can hinder the notion of urban planning being a 
collective endeavor by effectively excluding public voices that seek to be, or need to be included.  
Valiante, concludes that the legitimacy of the overall planning process “hinges on the strivings of 
councils and the OMB [now LPAT] to protect and expand opportunities for participation for a 
diverse number of voices, especially from traditionally unrepresented interests.”400 Although the 
restructuring of Ontario’s land use planning appeal board was deemed by stakeholders as the 
“largest planning-centred opportunity before the province,”401 the effects of the amendments 
have resulted in a framework that reduces opportunities for citizen participation.  
 
The results of municipal funding structures, developer influence in municipal politics, and often 
inadequate public consultation has resulted in inherent disadvantages for many marginalized 
communities within municipalities. Several attempts at state sponsored urban renewal in the 
United States provide examples of situations in which the interests of pro-growth coalitions were 
favoured over low-income and minority interests by local governments. Specifically, New Haven 
and Denver both saw pro-growth coalitions displace high numbers of low-income and senior 
residences at the expense of more lucrative commercial, or high-end residential units.402 Over the 
course of the urban renewal scheme there was a net loss of 5636 low-moderate income housing 
in New Haven.403 Similarly, in Denver 39% of households in one community were displaced by 
increased costs.404 Using traditional methods of public engagement and consultation in the land 
use planning context has also resulted in disadvantages for communities as a result of race, 
sexual orientation, gender, and income as a result of exclusion from planning processes.405 
 
A community group or individual members of the public can play a significant factor in urban 
coalitions or regimes406 if there is access to adequate resources and knowledge, or numbers to 
influence decision making.  This influence, often appears as local opposition to planning 
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proposals and has been witnessed as playing a role in the outcome of several Ontario planning 
decisions, including a large public outcry resulting in an interim control bylaw preventing a 
Walmart from developing in Toronto’s Kensington Market.407  Similarly, when a public 
authority attempted to create condominium developments across several blocks in an area of 
Denver occupied by a fairly affluent population, the threat of important support at the next 
municipal election and litigation killed the project at city council.408. Additionally, opposition to 
a new Denver convention centre district delayed the project for 10 years through litigation and 
was able to secure approximately 2600 low-income residential units throughout the plan and 
surrounding area.409  
 
These examples demonstrate the ability for public input and participation to influence decisions. 
However, the examples also demonstrate that there must be a threat or influence to political 
power by the group looking to exert influence over a planning proposal. As previously discussed, 
not only is it difficult for low income and underrepresented groups to take part in the planning 
process as a result of expenses and lacking input mechanisms,410 but the structure of the 
municipal financial system is set-up in a manner that inherently targets locations with the 
potential for higher land value in order to seek economic growth.411  When enough influence is 
generated by a community, whether through numbers or resources, opposition can be 
successful.412 As stated by Fainstein, when in areas where the electoral majority of the 
population oppose development, municipal and other level of government struggle to attract 
economic investment.413 Where there is close to equal representation among income groups, 
governments may implement other mechanisms to protect residents of a community, such as 
rent-control or low-income tax policies to support these residents, while concurrently 
implementing growth or economic development policies.414 
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As a result of Bill 139 the planning process has not changed in regards to its influences, public 
input and decision making requirements. However, the ability to challenge the results of an often 
times unequal planning process has been amended in such a manner as to weaken the fairness of 
the system overall. Studies have concluded that allowing corporations to contribute to municipal 
elections is a method of transferring economic inequality into political or power inequality415 and 
that “with current planning rules and sources of taxation, municipalities will never be able to 
resist poorly planned development even if it is opposed by citizens.416  
 
The changes to the appeal system make opposition from citizens more challenging to mount.  
While the OMB was bound by provincial legislation, the former appeals process provided a more 
robust avenue for appeal participants to take part, provide evidence, cross-examine opposing 
evidence, and have an impartial decision maker make a determination on both conformity and 
planning grounds. The amendments to the appeal regime limit these opportunities for meaningful 
participation and use of information. Additionally, the increased authority of municipal decisions 
without an equally powerful countermeasure for improved consultation or public input will likely 
perpetuate the inequities already at play within the planning system and promote the values of 
whatever group can most influence municipal councils.  
 
Are We Worse Off? 
  
“Democratic deliberations function properly only in situations 
of equal opportunity.”417 
 
Acknowledging that urban planning appeal and decision making processes are geared towards 
finality and an overall inclination to relying on development for economic growth as opposed to 
social equity418 is an important step in the process to achieving both procedural justice and 
fairness in the planning system. Looking at the overall impacts to Ontario’s planning system as a 
consequence of the appeal process amendments provides a unique perspective on the true effects 
the changes will have.  Much of the justification for the changes made to the appeals regime 
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were based on claims of democratic decision making, a voice for communities, and fairness.419 
However, as discussed by Fainstein, the justification of democratic institutions making decisions 
does not account for the structural inequalities of wealth and power that are present in the 
planning decision making process.420  The structural inequalities in the planning (and planning 
appeal) system have been extensively researched and touched upon in this paper.   
 
Fainstein’s objective is to focus planning discussions on the character of urban areas and social 
equity instead of the planning process which focusses on economic development.421 To 
Fainstein, equity is defined as “a distribution of both material and nonmaterial benefits derived 
from public policy that does not favour those who are already better off at the beginning. Further, 
it does not require that each person be treated the same, but that treatment be appropriate.”422 
Looking at the amendments to the appeals regime from this perspective, it is the changes to the 
appeals process that have the potential to influence equity where the real changes to the planning 
system may take place. 
 
As this research is a comparative analysis, addressing and providing solutions to the inequities 
that are likely to continue or intensify as a result of the Bill 139 amendments is not within the 
scope of this paper. However, several recommendations to adjust the current process which came 
up throughout this research will be briefly discussed and are encouraged as further research 
topics in regards to the topic of land use planning, appeal tribunals, and equity.  
 
First, the re-establishment of the LPASC should studied. In addition to applying its eligibility 
criteria in a matter that addresses cost barriers for potential appeal participants, the LPASC 
should also increase public participation during the early stages of the planning process through 
outreach, education, and partnerships.423 If a deliberative or more inclusive approach to front-end 
planning was implemented through such an initiative, community members could build capacity 
and knowledge within the planning system and seek to be included when and how each 
community desired. As a result, equity, equal treatment, and a further legitimacy to the planning 
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process through the inclusion of less represented groups may result.424 Furthermore, outreach, 
education, and partnerships should increase the communities’ awareness of the LPASC and thus 
enable assistance to be sought at the beginning stages of a planning conflict, when it is critical to 
submit information to municipal councils.  
 
Second, while the increased responsibility of municipalities’ poses as a potential threat to public 
influence on planning decisions, it also creates the opportunity for a more equitable planning 
process. Several stakeholders and interviewees foresee that the appeal system amendments will 
result in an obligation for greater municipal participation throughout a planning application.425 
At the municipal level, improving public input requirements to ensure a more deliberate 
approach to planning where appropriate may provide meaningful outcomes and should be 
researched. Such a requirement may be implemented though municipal policy, however, the 
most powerful and authoritative signal would be provincial legislation mandating a more 
extensive and inclusive public participation scheme.  
 
Addressing equity issues at the front end of the planning system is a potential mechanism to 
addressing the concerns raised in regards to increased municipal authority during planning 
decision making and a reduction in public input opportunities at the appeal stage. For example, 
overall conflict and the amount of time spent on appeals can be reduced if focused deliberations 
take place at the outset of a project.426 A specific stakeholder suggests the model used by 
Mississauga during strategic planning exercises, which engages stakeholders through interest 
groups, negotiation, and research through a “bottom-up” approach.427  
 
In terms of attempting to address equitable concerns in the planning context, academics also 
suggest a deliberative approach to planning, which endeavours to address all interests and 
supports participation by disadvantaged groups.428 Similarly, in the FCA’s submission regarding 
OMB amendments it acknowledged that “democratic deliberation and comprehensive public 
                                                             
424 Ibid at 25-26.  
425 Bruce County, “Letter” supra note 151. 
426 Kevin Gericke & Jay Sullivan, “Public Participation and Appeals of Forest Service Plans – An Empirical Examination” 
(1994) 7:2 Society & Natural Resources: An International Journal 125 at 133. 
427  CLSR, “Letter”, supra note 11. 
428 Judith Innes & David Booher, “Reframing Public Participation: Strategies for the 21st Century” (2004) Planning Theory & 
Practice 5:4 419 at 426, 429-430. 
How Does the LPAT Match-up? A Comparative Analysis of Ontario’s Current and Former Land Use Planning Appeal Board 
 
 77 
  
engagement” is not always achieved locally and that it may be appropriate for the province to 
require improvements from municipalities in that regard.429 Successful examples of deliberative 
approaches to planning decision making have been analyzed around the globe, including in 
Norway430 and Australia.431 
 
The ability for the LPAT to send a successful appeal back to a municipal council for a new 
decision should again provide an opportunity for further or new equity based elements of 
planning to be considered, or at the very least, for some form of new public consultation to take 
place. However, legal experts are unsure as to whether public input is required to be sought when 
the LPAT sends a decision back.432  First, the legislation is ambiguous, simply stating that a 
decision will be sent back for reconsideration. Second, due to the tight ninety day timeline,433 an 
extensive public engagement can very likely not take place.434 Therefore, clarifying and ensuring 
a public input mechanism and providing an appropriate time period based on the complexity of 
each decision should be studied to ensuring meaningful voices are included at this influential 
time in the decision making process and should be looked into further.   
 
Additionally, while the LPAT is required to “have regard” to municipal decisions, as was also 
seen with the OMB, there is confusion over how this should be applied in specific 
circumstances.435 It has been suggested that a process similar to that of the OMB, but with an 
interpretation document outlining what is meant by “have regard to” in differing circumstances 
could provide a needed equity lens to the appeal process.436   
 
A guideline or framing document could outline that the tribunal is required to place a higher 
weight on a municipal decision based on the robustness of the public input used for that decision. 
For example, the tribunal would give more weight to an original municipal decision if the 
municipality engaged in an extensive, deliberative public consultation when reaching its 
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decision. However, if an inadequate public input mechanism was used in relation to the decision 
being made, the tribunal would limit the weight given to the original municipal decision.437  A 
process similar to, or including all of the above recommendations, may provide needed equity 
considerations into the planning and appeals process, and are topics for further research.   
Conclusion 
 
The role of any land use planning appeal tribunal is to resolve conflict over development policies 
and provide an environment in which government decisions can be challenged.438 Ontario’s 
previous land use planning appeal tribunal, the OMB, faced criticism and dissatisfaction from 
stakeholders which eventually led to its abolishment in spring, 2018. The frustration that lead to 
the OMB abolishment included stakeholder concerns over the opportunities to participate in and 
influence appeal decisions, the weight being given to certain voices, and the costs associated 
with the appeal process.439  Improving the fairness of Ontario’s land use planning appeal system 
was both a justification and cited outcome of enacting Bill 139, which replaced the OMB with 
the LPAT.440  
 
To determine whether stakeholders are, or will be satisfied with the new planning appeal 
mechanism, both the OMB and LPAT were analyzed on perceived procedural fairness criteria to 
determine which appeal venue provides, or provided a more procedurally fair appeal process. As 
a result of the comparative analysis between tribunals, this paper concludes that while both 
tribunals provide a relatively fair environment, in comparison to one another the OMB had 
greater subjectively fair elements. Additionally, certain changes to the appeal regime, 
specifically establishing the LPASC, have the potential to address equitable cost concerns raised 
with the OMB. However, other equity considerations were not addressed with the enactment of 
Bill 139. In fact, many of the changes implemented have the ability to perpetuate inequalities 
that already exist in the planning system. Furthermore, the LPAT has created some concerns of 
its own, including capacity issues for municipalities,441 an opportunity for proponents to submit 
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documents that cannot be properly reviewed by municipal decision makers or cross-examined by 
opposing parties,442 undermining the required increase in mandatory mediation discussions,443 
and providing municipalities with a stronger decision making role.  
 
In comparison to one another, the OMB provided a more robust coverage of procedural fairness 
characteristics than the LPAT. The OMB permitted a greater number of issues to be appealed on 
more expansive appeal grounds and accepted beneficial information during the appeal process, 
with an opportunity for opposing parties to cross-examine any evidence submitted. Additionally, 
there has been a reduction in a Participant’s ability to partake in oral representation at an appeal 
hearing as a result of the LPAT regime.444 Although the OMB appears to have provided a 
process that was overall more subjectively fair than its current counterpart, its processes still 
created equity concerns in relation to the costs associated with participating in an appeal and 
there were concerns over a lack of democratic decision making. The LPAT did not directly 
address the equitable concern of the cost requirements to effectively participating in the appeal 
process.445 However, Bill 139 did establish the LPASC to assist, guide, and represent appeal 
participants with unequal resources through planning appeal process.446 Despite the LPASC’s 
potential, its interim eligibility criteria places an emphasis on potential users’ ability to pay for 
expert planning reports, and as such may not significantly address cost concerns. Additionally, 
LPAT procedures now place significant importance on information presented to municipal 
councils somewhat early in the planning process. The current lack of knowledge about the 
LPASC’s existence will likely result in its ineffectiveness at serving the community it seeks to 
assist, especially in light of the increased importance of the early stages in the planning 
process.447 Furthermore, the LPASC will cease to exist as of June 30, 2019, extinguishing any 
potential it has to address concerns raised about the cost barriers to participation.   LPAT 
procedures also create a potential new public input opportunity for members of the public to 
participate in planning decisions through remitting a matter back to municipal councils if a 
successful appeal is filed.  
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Despite these potential benefits to the LPAT appeal regime, the effect of certain new procedures 
are also shown to likely have an adverse outcome. Notwithstanding the potential effect of the 
soon to be decommissioned LPASC, the LPAT procedures have failed to address the issue of 
costs associated with submitting evidence.448 The costs associated with providing information to 
the tribunal have merely been moved to earlier in the planning process as opposed to directly 
prior to an appeal hearing. While restricting the evidence considered during an appeal to each 
respective municipal council’s record does even the playing field during the hearing, the 
underlying issue of prohibitive costs is likely still very much a factor in receiving a favourable 
outcome on appeal. The costs associated with opposing a planning application may actually 
increase as a result of evidence being required for every planning application before council if an 
appeal is to be filed.  Additionally, anyone wishing to make oral representations at an appeal 
hearing must now risk financial liability. Likewise, the potential for parties with access to greater 
resources in a mediation environment to force a settlement have not been addressed.  
 
Additionally, the LPAT appears to have created several new concerns of its own. The new 
procedures have created several issues for municipalities. This includes workload capacity issues 
in that every planning decision must be prepared as if an appeal will take place. As well, the 
opportunity for proponents to submit documents hours before a deadline results in an inadequate 
review and consideration given by municipal decision makers.449 Furthermore, the timeline for 
submitting appeal records and holding case management conferences may undermine the 
required increase in mandatory ADR and mediation discussions, as expenses have already been 
incurred and positions have been established.450 Importantly, many of the new LPAT procedures 
provide municipalities with increased power and control over the planning process. As a result, 
any potential equitable or influence concerns during the municipal decision making process may 
be exacerbated or go unaddressed, as cumulatively, the amendments result in limited initial 
decision making authority for the LPAT. 
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The increased power and control over the planning process given to municipalities is reflected in 
the increased significance of municipal planning documents as a result of the reduction in 
municipal decisions that can be appealed, and the fact that municipal councils have two 
opportunities to make a valid decision. The influence of property values and the development 
industry on municipal decision making processes,451 coupled with the increased control over the 
planning process given to municipalities has the potential to push a pro-growth agenda on many 
communities. Additionally, the legislated public input requirements have been demonstrated to 
not ensure an expansive collection of viewpoints, specifically in regards to marginalized 
individuals within the community452 and that a lack of knowledge regarding the requirements of 
public input mechanisms in Ontario’s planning system serves as a barrier to participation.453 
Despite the potential for certain community voices to be overshadowed or unheard in the 
planning process, deliberative public input mechanisms have been demonstrated to assist in 
addressing equity issues associated with participating in the planning process.454  Ensuring 
community voices are heard in the planning process is a major concern in a system where 
municipalities benefit from developing land, the development industry can influence decision 
making, and public input mechanisms are often inadequate.  As a result, ensuring a deliberative 
public input mechanism is incorporated into Ontario’s planning system is a topic that should be 
further researched.  
 
To further determine if equitable considerations should be required in the planning appeal 
process without completely overhauling Ontario’s land use planning appeal system, four topics 
are suggested for further research.  First, the LPASC should continue to operate. In addition to 
addressing cost barriers for potential appeal participants, the LPASC could increase public 
participation during the early stages of the planning process through outreach, education, and 
partnerships. Second, the implementation of provincial legislation or municipal policies 
mandating a more extensive, inclusive, and deliberative public participation scheme may assist in 
ensuring that public voices are heard during the stages of the planning process that have acquired 
new significance due to the Bill 139 amendments. Similarly, ensuring that when the LPAT sends 
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a successful appeal back to a municipal council, that an appropriate amount of time is given to 
ensure a meaningful public input process can be implemented would help to ensure that the 
additional powers given to municipalities are considering community voices.   
 
Finally, requiring the LPAT to give a higher weighting to municipal decisions in appeal settings 
that have had an extensive and deliberative public consultation process inform the outcome may 
be a solution that addresses multiple stakeholder concerns in a pragmatic manner. While the 
procedural fairness of Ontario’s appeal process may be adequate, it must be ensured that the 
consequences of these processes provide an environment in which planning can function as a 
collective endeavour as opposed to a system in which powerful influences can dictate how 
communities are shaped. 
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Appendix One: List of Acronyms 
 
ADR  Alternative Dispute Resolution  
BVA  Bayview Village Association 
CELA  Canadian Environmental Law Association  
ELTO  Environment and Land Tribunals Ontario  
FCA  Federation of Citizens’ Associations of Ottawa 
LPASC Local Planning Appeal Support Centre 
LPAT  Local Planning Appeal Tribunal 
OHBA  Ontario Home Builders Association 
OMB  Ontario Municipal Board 
OP  Official Plan 
RPCO   Regional Planning Commissioners of Ontario 
ZBL  Zoning Bylaw 
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Appendix Two: Comparison of Descriptive Factors 
Between the OMB and the LPAT 
Sources: The Planning Act, Local Planning Appeal Tribunal Act, Ontario Municipal Board Act. 
 
 Ontario’s Former and Current Land Use Planning Appeal Tribunals 
Appeal Board Ontario Municipal Board 
(Historic to April 2) 
Local Planning Appeal Tribunal 
(current: April 12) 
Structural context 
of the tribunal 
The OMB was established as a provincial administrative 
tribunal in 1906 and served as Ontario’s land use planning 
appeal mechanism as recently as April 2, 2018, when it was 
replaced by the LPAT (On April 3, 2018) (website). Prior to 
being named the OMB, the OMB was the Ontario Railway and 
Municipal Board.  (OMB Act s.3)     
Prior to April 3, 2018, the LPAT was known as 
the OMB. The Local Planning Appeal Tribunal 
Act continues the OMB under the name of 
LPAT (s.2(1)), with several amendments to the 
Board’s powers and required procedures.   
Statutory powers 
and 
responsibilities of 
each tribunal 
3(5) OMB decisions were required to be consistent with 
Provincial Policy statements and conform to, or not conflict 
with provincial plans.  
 
The OMB was required to make decisions with regard to 
matters of provincial interest (s.2), to decisions made by 
council, and any information considered by council when 
making the decision (s.2.1) 
No change to s.2, s.2.1 or 3(5) in regards to OP 
or ZBL. 
 
 
 
The nature and 
substance of an 
appeal 
Official Plans  
Appeals could be made on both good planning and conformity 
ground in the following circumstances:  
- s.17(24) and 17(36) Can appeal all or part of the 
decision to adopt all or part of an OP (with exceptions)  
- 22(7) the decision on a private requested amendment 
(with exceptions)  
- 17(40) a failure to make a decision on all or part of a 
plan  
 
Exceptions for the above include:  
- Secondary suite policies (17(24.1)) ((17(36.1) unless 
by the Minister ((24.1.1.)(36.1.1)  
- An entire new OP (24.2 (36.2)).  
- Part of an OP that identifies areas: 
-  within a boundary identified by the province  
- of forecasted population and growth as seen in a 
growth plan or upper tier official plan 
- showing boundaries of an area of settlement  
- listed in  s. 17(24.5) (24.4 and 36.4) 
 
Zoning Bylaws 
Appeals can be made on both good planning and conformity 
ground in the following circumstances:  
- (34(11)) When an application for a ZBL amendment is 
refused, or council fails to make a decision  (with 
exceptions), 
- 34(19) If council passed an amendment to, or a ZBL 
(with exceptions).   
 
Exceptions for the above include: 
Official Plans  
Appeals can only be made on conformity 
grounds in the same circumstances as under the 
OMB, with further exceptions.  
 
The further exceptions include (17(24.1.2) 
17(36.1.2):  
- Inclusionary zoning policies 
- Policies that identify major transit 
areas (Unless by the Minister 
(17(24.1.3) 17 (36.1.3)) 
  
Zoning Bylaws 
Appeals can only be made on conformity 
grounds in the same circumstances as under the 
OMB, with further exceptions.  
 
The further exceptions include: 
- 34(11.0.6) 24(19.3)  no appeal in 
respect to policies regarding 
inclusionary zoning 
- 34(19.5) no appeal for protected major 
transit areas(34(19.7)unless does not 
satisfy minimum density requirements)  
- 34(19.4)(19.8) and unless you are the 
minister.  
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- a ZBL amendment for the alteration of an area of 
settlement boundary or a new area of settlement, 
(11.0.4)  
-  a ZBL amendment removing areas from areas of 
employment (if OP has such a policy) (34(11.0.5). 
- parts of a bylaw that give effect to OP policies 
regarding secondary suites (34(19.1) unless you are the 
Minister (34(19.2).   
Type/form of 
hearing and 
procedures 
conducted, 
including if new 
evidence is 
accepted 
- On OP 17(44) and ZBL 34(24) appeals 51(52) 53(30) 
the OMB was required to hold a hearing.  
 
- For OP appeals (17(26.1)(37.2)) 22(8.1)), ZBL appeals 
(34(11.0.0.1)(20.1), council or planning board may 
decide to use mediation or other ADR techniques to 
resolve the conflict.  
 
- Information that was not provided to a municipality 
before it made its original decision regarding an OP s. 
17(44.3-44-6) or ZBL 34(24.3-24.6) appeal was 
permitted at a hearing if the OMB determined it may 
have materially affected the municipality’s original 
decision. However, the OMB was required to notify, 
and give the appropriate municipal council the 
opportunity to reconsider the decision in light of new 
information and make a recommendation to the OMB. 
(Time limit applies). If submitted in the prescribed 
time period, the OMB was required to have “regard 
for” the recommendation. (Applies despite conflicts 
with SPPA (s.17(44.7)).  
 
- The OMB could dismiss an appeal without holding a 
hearing for a number of reasons, including: If the OMB 
believed that an appeal was vexatious, frivolous, not 
made in good faith, made solely for the purpose of 
delay, had been brought by an applicant who 
continually abuses the appeals process, or did not 
disclose any apparent land use planning grounds for an 
appeal.  An appeal could also be dismissed without 
holding a hearing if the applicant: did not provide the 
required explanation or reasons for an appeal, pay the 
assigned fee, or not respond to a request by the OMB 
to pay the fee or to provide more information. If an 
appeal was dismissed without holding a hearing, the 
appellant was given the opportunity to make 
representations regarding the proposed dismissal, 
unless the appellant did not respond to a request by the 
OMB for more information. 17(46), 34(25.1), 44(17.1), 
51(54), 53(32).  
LPAT Act 39(1) -For appeals filled under the 
Planning Act regarding OP or ZBL 
(17(24)(36)(40), 22(7), 34(11)(19), the LPAT 
must direct the appellant and approval 
authority/muni to participate in a case 
management conference.  
 
LPAT Act: 42(3)(b) for appeals types listed 
above, no party or person may adduce evidence 
or call/examine witnesses.  
- The provision allowing new evidence 
at a hearing regarding OP s. 17(44.3-
44-6) and ZBL (34(24.3-24.6) was 
repealed by Bill 139: Building Better 
Communities and Conserving 
Watershed Act, 2017. 
 
- An appeal regarding the decision or 
non-decision of an OP or ZBL cannot 
be dismissed without holding a hearing 
if the appeal application does not 
disclose any land use planning ground 
upon which to base the appeal, as this 
is not a requirement of an appeal. 
However, the LPAT can dismiss an OP 
or ZBL appeal without a hearing if it 
believes the appeal explanation does 
not disclose the required information 
regarding consistency, conformity, or 
conflict with provincial policy, 
provincial plans, or corresponding Ops, 
as the case may be (17(45))(34(25)).  
 
 
Discretion of 
tribunal to 
intervene in local 
decisions 
General:  
OMB Act- apart from the below (96(4)): a decision of the OMB 
on a question of fact was final and binding (92(3)). 
- The OMB had the authority to  review, rescind or vary 
and decision it has made (s.43) (in accordance with the 
rules) 
- Rule 111: the Chair was required to consider a request 
for review if the appropriate information and fee were 
General: 
No Change 
 
Official Plan 
17(49.7) After the LPAT has given a 
municipality the chance to reconsider a 
successfully appealed OP or OPA (22(11.0.15)) 
and the resubmitted OP is again inconsistent 
How Does the LPAT Match-up? A Comparative Analysis of Ontario’s Current and Former Land Use Planning Appeal Board 
 
 86 
  
submitted, (112) within 30 days of decision (unless 
extended). 
- The executive chair could also initiate a request for 
review (119) 
 
96(1) Within matters of its jurisdiction, an appeal could be made 
from the OMB to the Divisional Court on a question of law.   
 
Official Plan 
s.17(50)- On an appeal, the OMB had the power to approve all 
or part of an OP, make modifications to all or part of the Plan 
and approve all or part of the modified plan, or refuse to 
approve all or part of a OP. 
 
Zoning Bylaw 
No Decision made: 34(11.0.2) the OMB could either dismiss an 
appeal, amend a bylaw in such a manner as if saw fit, or direct a 
bylaw be amended in accordance with an order.  
 
34(26) the OMB could dismiss an appeal in whole or in part, 
repeal a bylaw in whole or in part, direct a municipality to 
repeal a bylaw in whole or in part or to amend bylaw. 
 
 
with Provincial Policy or does not 
conform/conflicts with a provincial plan, and a 
second appeal is filed, the LPAT can refuse to 
approve all or part of the plan or amendment, or 
make modifications to all or part of the plan or 
amendment, and/or approve the amendment.   
 
17(50) If an OP appeal is filed due to failure to 
make a decision then no change from the OMB.  
 
Zoning Bylaw 
If appealing a refused ZBL amendment, only 
after the municipality has been given the 
opportunity to ensure that existing provisions of 
the ZBL that are inconsistent with Provincial 
Policy or do not conform or conflicts with a 
provincial plan are replaced by complying 
provisions can the LPAT direct the municipality 
to amend the bylaw, or amend the bylaw itself. 
(34(26.1-7)).  
 
34(26.8) If appealing the passing of a ZBL or a 
ZBL amendment, only after the municipality 
has been given the opportunity to re-determine 
if the actions in questions ensure existing and 
new parts of the bylaw are consistent with 
provincial policy statements and conform or do 
not conflict with provincial plans can the LPAT 
in whole or in part repeal, amend, or direct the 
municipality to repeal or amend the ZBL. 
Requirements of 
due process 
For all OMB appeals regarding approvals, refusals, or 
conditions, the notice of appeal was required to be submitted to 
the municipality with 20 days of notification of the original 
decision.   
If no decision was made the time period for submitting an 
appeal varied between what types of appeal is at issue.  
- For OP appeals (or amendments), an appeal was 
permitted to be filed 180 days subsequent to a 
complete application being submitted.  
- ZBLs had a time period of 120 days before an appeal 
can be submitted.  
 
For the majority of appeals, once the notice of appeal was filed 
the municipality or approval authority (whichever was 
appropriate), was required to submit the record of appeal with 
the OMB within 15 days of the final day the notice of appeal 
may have been submitted.  
 
If a type of ADR was permitted, the 15 day time limit to submit 
the appeal record to the OMB was extended to 75 days. There 
were no time periods in which a hearing must be held once the 
appeal record was submitted or to when a decision was required 
to be released subsequent to a hearing concluding.  
 No change, except time periods below: 
 
Time period for no decisions on OP appeals is 
now 210 days, not 180.  
Time period for no decisions on ZBL appeals is 
now 150 days, not 120.   
 
If tribunal gives municipality another chance to 
make a decision – muni must follow the 90 day 
time periods in s 22(11.0.12). 
Who has standing 
to file an appeal 
Official Plan 
All or part of the decision on an OP 
Standing to File: 17(24) 
No Change entirely.  
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or take part in an 
appeal process?  
(1) A person or public body who, before the plan was 
adopted, made oral submissions at a public meeting or 
written submissions to council. 
(2) The Minister. 
(3) The appropriate approval authority (unless OP is not 
exempt from approval – s 17(36)). 
(4) In the case of a request to amend the plan, the person or 
public body that made the request. 
(5) s.17(40) If notice of a decision in respect to all or part 
of the plan was not given, any person or public body 
may appeal.  
 
Added as a Party: 
s. 17(44.1—44.2) for OP appeals either exempt from, or not 
exempt from approval, only the minister, the approval authority, 
or a person or public body that made oral submissions at a 
public meeting or written submissions to council before the plan 
was adopted, or the OMB is of the opinion that there are 
reasonable grounds to add the person/public body as a party can 
be added as parties to the appeal. 
 
Any part, or all of a Requested Amendment to OP  
Standing to Appeal 
s.22(7)   
(1) person or public body that requested the amendment 
(2) The Minister 
(3) The appropriate approval authority 
 
Added as a Party 
22(11.0.1) only the minister, the approval authority, or a person 
or public body that before the requested amendment was refused 
made submissions at a public meeting or written submissions to 
council or planning board Or the tribunal is of the opinion that 
there are reasonable grounds to add them may be added as a 
party.  
 
Zoning Bylaw 
Zoning Bylaw amendment refused: 
Standing to Appeal: 
34(11)  
(1) The applicant 
(2) Or the minister  
 
34(19) if a zoning bylaw was passed, Then, in addition to the 
parties above,  
 any person or public body who made oral submissions 
at a public meeting or written submissions to council  
 
Added As a Party: 
34(24.1) for an appeal in respect to a refused amendment, or an 
appeal where zoning bylaw was passed. only The Minister, or a 
person or public body that made oral submissions at a public 
meeting or written submissions to council may be added as a 
party or if the Board is of the opinion that there are reasonable 
grounds to add the person or public body.  
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Appendix Three: Top 20 OMB and LPAT Lexis Advance 
Quicklaw decisions that contain the phrase “Official Plan” 
between October 1, 2016 and October 10, 2018 
 
1) Robert Salna Holdings Inc. v. Richmond Hill (Town), [2017] O.M.B.D. No. 1158 
2) J-G Cordone Investments Ltd. v. Richmond Hill (Town), [2017] O.M.B.D. No. 722 
3) Ajax (Town) v. Pickering (City), [2017] O.M.B.D. No. 663 
4) Simcoe (County) v. Simcoe (County), [2016] O.M.B.D. No. 1098 
5) 2373521 Ontario Corporation v. Uxbridge (Township), [2016] O.M.B.D. No. 881 
6) Bahardoust v. Toronto (City), [2018] O.M.B.D. No. 185 
7) J. Stollar Construction Ltd. v. Kawartha Lakes (City), 2018 LNONLPAT 513 
8) P.A.R.C.E.L. Inc. v. Markham (City), 2018 LNONLPAT 16 
9) Skyline Retail Real Estate Holdings Inc. v. Woolwich (Township), 2018 LNONLPAT 
238 
10) Connelly v. Guelph (City), 2018 LNONLPAT 143 
11) Ryan v. South Bruce Peninsula (Town), [2017] O.M.B.D. No. 989 
12) 567485 Ontario Ltd. v. Toronto (City), 2018 LNONLPAT 366 
13) 2160556 Ontario Inc. v. Oakville (Town), [2018] O.M.B.D. No. 163 
14) Casertano Developments Corp. v. Vaughan (City), 2018 LNONLPAT 231 
15) Casertano Developments Corp v. Vaughan (City), 2018 LNONLPAT 516 
16) Eden Oak (Trailshead) Inc. v. Blue Mountains (Town), [2017] O.M.B.D. No. 896 
17) Hedbern Development Corp. v. Barrie (City), [2018] O.M.B.D. No. 127 
18) Morrison v. Durham (Regional Municipality), [2017] O.M.B.D. No. 1161 
19) Silvercreek Commercial Builders Inc. v. Halton Hills (Town), [2017] O.M.B.D. No. 260 
20) York Energy Centre LP v. King (Township), 2018 LNONLPAT 387 
